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Abstract. Conventional democratic institutions aggregate preferences 
poorly. The norm of one-person-one-vote with majority rule treats people 
fairly by giving everyone an equal chance to influence outcomes, but fails 
to give proportional weight to people whose interests in a social outcome 
are stronger than those of other people—a problem that leads to the 
familiar phenomenon of tyranny of the majority. Various institutions that 
have been tried or proposed over the years to correct this problem—
including supermajority rule, weighted voting, cumulative voting, “mixed 
constitutions,” executive discretion, and judicially protected rights—all 
badly misfire in various ways, for example, by creating gridlock or 
corruption. This paper proposes a new form of political decision-making 
based on the theory of quadratic voting. It explains how quadratic voting 
solves the preference aggregation problem by giving proper weight to 
preferences of varying intensity, how it can be incorporated into political 
institutions, and why it should improve equity. 
 
Introduction 
 
 Groups frequently make collective decisions through majority rule. 
Legislators pass bills by majority; shareholders make most corporate decisions by 
(share-weighted) majority rule, as do directors; clubs, university faculties, and 
civic associations typically use majority rule as well. The reason that they do so is 
not entirely clear. Majority rule seems fair—and certainly fairer than rule by one 
(dictatorship) or a minority—but it is not obviously fairer than rule by unanimity 
or consensus, or rule by a supermajority like two-thirds. Majority rule has some 
useful properties but it often fails to advance the good of the group. 
 
1 Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School; Assistant 
Professor of Economics, University of Chicago. Thanks to Fabrizio Cariani, Ben Laurence, Daryl 
Levinson, Jonathan Masur, Philip Pettit, Sparsha Saha, Adrian Vermeule, and participants at 
workshops at the University of Chicago Law School and St. John’s Law School, for helpful 
comments, and to Matthew Brincks, Siobhan Fabio, John Moynihan, Michael Olijnyk, Tim 
Rudnicki, and Robert Sandoval for research assistance. 
                                                 
The basic problem with majority rule is well-known: majorities can 
disregard the legitimate interests of minorities. Imagine, for example, that a 
community is trying to decide whether to devote funds collected from taxes to 
build a park. A large minority, including elderly people and families with young 
children, would benefit greatly from a park; a bare majority doesn’t have strong 
views but on balance doesn’t want to spend the money. The majority can block 
the park even if the minority gains more from the park than the majority loses: 
there is no mechanism for ensuring that the majority takes into account the 
minority’s disproportionate interests. For example, if the minority consists of 
10,000 people who value the park at $100 each, and the majority consists of 
11,000 people who disvalue the park at $2 each, the majority prevails even though 
the park generates a net social product of $978,000. More troublesome examples 
are easy to imagine and occur throughout history. In politics, majority rule—
unrestricted by constitutional protections—permits the majority to expropriate the 
property of the minority, throw them in jail, and deprive them of the franchise. 
Even when the majority respects basic rights, it may deprive minorities of benefits 
and privileges that are available to others. The most prominent example from 
recent years, which we discuss in some numerical detail below, is the claim that 
the majority of Americans in various states unfairly deny the legal benefits of 
marriage to same-sex couples. 
 
 The possibility that the majority may disregard the interests of the 
minority has a well-known label: it is “tyranny of the majority.”2 But what is 
wrong with tyranny of the majority? One could argue that tyranny of the majority 
is just a negative label for “democracy,” a label wielded by special interests, 
privileged groups, and others who fear majority rule. If all citizens are equal, what 
could be fairer than allowing the majority of them to determine policy, either 
directly or through representatives?3 
2 The concept of tyranny of the majority is as old as majority rule, as will be discussed; early users 
of the phrase include John Adams, Alexis de Tocqueville, who popularized it, and John Stuart 
Mill, among others. John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United 
States of America, Vol. 3, reprinted in The Works of John Adams 6 (Charles Francis Adams ed. 
1851) (1788); Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Penguin 
Putnam 2004) (1835); John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale 
University Press 2003) (1859). Many formulations of it exist, of course, e.g.: Thomas Paine, 
Dissertations on Government; the Affairs of the Bank; and Paper Money (1786) (“despotism may 
be more effectually acted by many over a few than by one man over all”).  
3 A number of theorems illustrate the attractive features of majority rule but show that it achieves 
good social outcomes only under narrow conditions. See, e.g., Howard R. Bowen, The 
Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources, 27 Q. J. Econ. 58 (1943); 
Kenneth O. May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority 
Decisions, 20 Econometrica 680 (1952); Douglas W. Rae, Decision-Rules and Individual Values 
in Constitutional Choice, 63 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 40 (1969); Michael J. Taylor, Proof of a 
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 But there are good reasons to be worried about tyranny of the majority. 
The first reason is that, as noted, majority rule, unless constrained to prevent 
tyranny of the majority, will not necessarily advance the public good. Majority 
rule can lead to the systematic transfer of wealth or resources from a minority to 
the majority. From the standpoint of the public interest, such systematic transfers 
are sometimes justified (for example, transfers from rich to poor), but they need 
not be, and nothing about majority rule guarantees that such transfers will 
promote public well-being. The transfers may go from one morally arbitrary 
group to another—for example, election winners to election losers, or poorer 
people to wealthier people, or black people to white people. Often these transfers 
incur substantial waste both administratively and in separating goods from the 
owners that most value them.4 Moreover, because the harm from being trapped in 
a minority is so great, people will struggle to form coalitions that constitute a 
majority—a high-stakes game that consumes time and resources that could be 
more productively spent elsewhere. 
 
 There are actually two distinct problems here that are often merged 
together. In the United States, tyranny of the majority usually refers to the 
systematic and repeated use of the political process by a relatively stable majority 
(such as white people) to pass legislation that benefits it at the expense of a 
“discrete and insular” minority (such as black people).5 It is sometimes thought 
that majority rule is less troublesome when groups “take turns” playing a role in 
the majority. For example, if whites and Latinos outvote African-Americans on a 
bill proposed this year, but then African-Americans have a chance to form a 
coalition with Latinos to outvote whites next year, and so on, one might believe 
that “tyranny of the majority” does not take place. But whatever label one uses, 
majority rule is still not optimal. The reason is that if the white-Latino coalition 
inefficiently expropriates from African-Americans in year 1 by using inefficient 
legislation that reduces public welfare, and the black-Latino coalition does the 
Theorem on Majority Rule, 14 Beh. Sci. 228 (1969); Ted C. Bergstrom, When Does Majority 
Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?, 81 Scand. J. of Econ. 216 (1979). The large literature on 
voting rules is surveyed in Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III (2003); Kenneth A. Shepsle, 
Analyzing Politics (2d. ed. 2010); and other volumes. Lurking in the background is Arrow’s 
theorem, which proves that under relatively broad conditions, no voting system can produce 
outcomes that are both Pareto-efficient and non-dictatorial. Arrow’s theorem assumes ordinal 
preferences; the quadratic voting system we discuss below does not. 
4 There are countless historical examples of the violent transfer of resources from a minority group 
to the majority; the expropriation of assets of Jewish citizens by the Nazi government in Germany 
is the canonical example, See Constance Harris, The Way Jews Lived: Five Hundred Years of 
Printed Words and Images 328 (2009). 
5 See, e.g., Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority (1994). 
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same in year 2, and so on, then majority rule makes possible legislation that 
causes social harm even if it is spread out among all groups rather than 
concentrated in a single group—social harm that the political process should 
avoid if possible. When we use the term “tyranny of the majority,” we mean to 
refer to this broader problem with majority rule systems, and not just to the first 
case.6 
  
 The second reason for being worried about tyranny of the majority is that 
majority rule can short-circuit democracy. If democracy means that members of 
the public play a role in governance, majority rule can subvert democracy by 
excluding even large minorities from self-governance. The majority can entrench 
itself by throwing up hurdles to political participation by minorities—
gerrymandering districts, imposing censorship, raising the cost of political 
organization, even disenfranchising the minority. In these ways, temporary 
electoral successes can lead to a permanent weakening of democratic institutions. 
Recently, tyranny of the majority was the rallying cry of liberal groups in Egypt 
during the administration of President Mohamed Morsi before he was overthrown 
by the Egyptian army; in Turkey under President Recep Erdoğan; and in Russia 
under President Vladimir Putin. In Turkey and Russia, minorities protested but 
made no headway; in Egypt, they repudiated democracy because Egyptian 
democratic institutions did not protect them.7 
 
 For these reasons, both philosophers and practical politicians have sought 
limits on majority rule so as to minimize or eliminate its negative consequences. 
For the purpose of this paper, we will ignore one extreme—autocracy or 
dictatorship—which has the obvious defect that it enables the ruler to exploit the 
6 For example, suppose that proposed government projects routinely produce 100 for A, 100 for B, 
and -300 for C. Even if over time, different people or groups take turns playing the role of A or B 
or C, a system of majority rule that approved all of these projects would gradually impoverish 
everyone even if it did not single out any particular individuals or groups for particularly 
burdensome treatment. The legal literature on judicial review (discussed below) largely ignores 
this problem, and focuses instead on settings where the same group always is forced to take the 
role of C. 
7 See Michael Kelley, Egypt Is Falling Apart On The Anniversary Of The Revolution, Bus. Insider 
(Jan. 25, 2013, 12:52 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/egypt-on-the-anniversary-of-its-
revolution-2013-1; E.J. Dionne, Obama Embraces Democratic Realism Abroad, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 
13, 2011) http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-12-13/news/ct-oped-1213-dionne-
20111213_1_human-rights-foreign-policy-state-hillary-rodham-clinton; Laurence Norman & Joe 
Parkinson, Erdogan Aims to Ease EU Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2014, 4:24 PM), 
http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-431363/. 
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majority, and not just the minority.8 But many other institutional arrangements are 
consistent with the spirit behind majority rule—the idea that the population 
should govern itself both because self-governance leads to good outcomes and 
because self-governance is required by fairness or democracy. These 
arrangements include supermajority rules, bicameralism and separation of powers, 
weighted voting, judicial review, representational democracy, and much else. 
Unfortunately, they all have significant problems, indeed, basically the same 
problem: they either give insufficient power to minorities, allowing tyranny of the 
majority, or they give excessive power to minorities, which leads to gridlock as 
well as unfair political outcomes. No existing system calibrates the power 
afforded to minorities to the strength of their interests in a given policy decision. 
 
 A new type of voting system, however, offers a solution. Under quadratic 
voting (QV), everyone votes on proposals (in the case of referenda) or candidates 
by buying as many votes pro or con as they want. The price they pay is the square 
of the number of votes they buy. The amount collected is redistributed back to the 
voters on a pro rata basis. As shown by one of us,9 QV guarantees outcomes that 
maximize social welfare. It avoids tyranny of the majority by giving the minority 
the ability to buy extra votes, but because the minority must pay a price per vote 
proportional to the votes they purchase, it does not allow the minority to extract 
unfair outcomes or cause gridlock. 
 
 We realize that some readers will not take seriously a political voting 
system that allows people to buy votes. There is a strong taboo against vote-
buying, and one may worry that such a system will benefit the rich at the expense 
of the poor. However, we will show that the taboo reflects the harmful effects of 
money in an ordinary political system, such as one-person-one-vote majority rule, 
and the logic of the taboo does not apply to QV. Moreover, we will show that QV 
would improve the equity of voting outcomes compared to the status quo. 
 
 The first part of this paper sets the stage for quadratic voting by providing 
a brief survey of efforts to develop voting and related mechanisms to solve the 
problem of tyranny of the majority, or, more specifically, ensure that governments 
make decisions that advance the public good rather than wastefully shift around 
resources among interest groups. We show how all approaches have significant 
difficulties, which explains why democracy remains the “worst form of 
8 However, dictatorships usually are supported by powerful minorities, which believe that they 
would do worse under a system of majority rule. See Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2006). 
9 See E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying (April 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2003531. 
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government except all those other forms that have been tried,” in Winston 
Churchill’s words.10 The second part of this paper explains how QV works, how 
it can be applied to democratic politics, and why it is superior to other voting 
systems. 
 
I. The Problem of Intense Preferences in Democracy 
 
A. Ancient Times 
 
 The earliest examples of institutionalized majority rule come from 
Homeric, German, and Spartan assemblies, where the group expresses its 
preference by acclamation, with the presiding officer declaring the outcome.11 
Rule by acclamation (rather than ballot) may have been convenient for an 
illiterate population (though the use of ballots does not require literacy), but an 
interesting, and apparently intentional, feature of it is that it permits people to 
express the intensity of their preferences by shouting or murmuring. An intense 
minority could thus outshout a waffling majority, at least as long as the minority 
is not too small. The aggregate level of sound in this way reflects both the number 
of voters and the intensity of their preferences. To be sure, people could act 
strategically by shouting when they did not have strong opinions, but the publicity 
of the act and the risk of being seen as a strategic actor may have limited the value 
of this option. 
 
 The purest form of democracy known to history was the Athenian 
democracy of the 5th century B.C. Most government power was held by the 
Assembly, which consisted of all (adult male) citizens regardless of their social 
status or property holdings. Although magistrates, boards, councils, courts and 
other offices and institutions existed, their power was subordinate to that of the 
Assembly. The Assembly could pass laws, issue decrees affecting individuals, 
and punish political leaders with ostracism and other sanctions, including death. 
Every member of the Assembly had one vote, and majority rule prevailed. 
 
 But the Athenians were well-aware of the dangers of majority rule. In one 
famous incident during the Peloponnesian War,12 the Assembly tried and 
10 Winston Churchill, 444 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 207 (1947). 
11 John Gilbert Heinberg, History of the Majority Principle, 20 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 52, 55 (1926). 
In Sparta, “The loudness of the cry was judged by men shut up in a house near the Apella, from 
which they could hear the cry, but could not see the assembly.” Id. See also Melissa Schwartzberg, 
Counting the Many: The Origins and Limits of Supermajority Rule 21-25 (2013) (discussing 
acclamation systems). 
12 Xenophon, Hellencia, Book 1 (G. Bell and Sons 1897). 
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condemned to death a group of generals for failing to rescue survivors and 
recover the bodies of the dead after a naval victory off the Arginoussai islands; 
later, persuaded that a storm prevented the generals from acting, the Assembly 
condemned to death the generals’ accusers.13 The account left to us by Xenophon 
depicts an out-of-control mob that, manipulated by demagogues and provoked by 
a sympathetic survivor of the disaster, disregarded constitutional norms. 
 
Greek thinkers often disparaged Greek democracy because the masses of 
poor could outvote the smaller group of educated people, and could force through 
wealth transfers. Plato saw democracy as lawless rule of the mob.14 Aristotle held 
a more favorable view of democracy but similarly believed that because the poor 
form the majority, they will rule so as to advance their own interests rather than 
the common good. In a famous passage he suggested weighting votes by property 
holdings, possibly as a way for reflecting preference intensity.15 The playwright 
Aristophanes satirized democratic decision-making by citing examples of the poor 
outvoting the rich on the raising of fleets, which the rich paid for while supplying 
the poor with jobs as sailors.16 In Polybius’ words, 
 
By its violence and contempt of law [democracy] becomes sheer 
mob-rule… For the mob, habituated to feed at the expense of 
others, and to have its hopes of livelihood in the property of its 
neighbor, as soon as it has got a leader sufficiently ambitious and 
daring, being excluded by poverty from the sweets of civil honors, 
produces a reign of mere violence. Then come tumultuous 
assemblies, massacres, banishments, [and] redivisions of land….17 
 
After their defeat in the Peloponnesian War, which was blamed in part on 
the poor decisions of the majority, Athenians introduced a more moderate form of 
democracy. They gave more power to independent bodies, including a 
commission that proposed legislation (the Nomothetai), and a People’s Court, 
which had the power to strike down decrees of the Assembly that violated the 
laws. Since the members of all these bodies were selected by lot, the practical 
effect was to require multiple majority votes involving different groups of people, 
13 Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes 6 (J.A. Crook 
trans., University of Oklahoma Press 1999). 
14 Plato, The Apology 31-32, and Plato, The Republic 473, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues 
(Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds. & Hugh Tredennick trans., 1987). 
15 See Aristotle, Politics, Book 6, Part III (Benjamin Jowett trans., Paul Negri & John Berseth eds., 
2000). 
16 Hansen, supra note at 8. 
17 Polybius, The Histories, Perseus Digital Library, 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234.  
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which amounted to an implicit supermajority requirement (except in rare cases 
where the median voter in both bodies had the same political preference). 
Members of the Court were required to be over thirty years old, unlike members 
of the Assembly, and were required to take oaths to uphold the law; these 
requirements would also have ensured that the bodies differed in ideological 
composition. Other procedural innovations—like requiring the Assembly to hold 
two meetings for approval of treaties and other decrees—also weakened the hand 
of the majority by forcing it to sustain itself over a period of time.18 Yet these 
procedures also led to gridlock, the great risk of supermajority rule, as we will 
discuss shortly.19 
 
 Another way to protect the interests of the minority in a majority-rule 
system is to give power to the agenda-setter or presiding officer. In ancient 
Athens and especially Rome, magistrates could sometimes thwart the will of the 
majority, especially when the majority was subject to a fleeting passion, by 
announcing that the gods disapproved of the voting date, or by manipulating the 
order of the voting.20 Both polities also gave discretion to magistrates, and they 
could use that discretion to advance the common good when their activities could 
not be observed and checked by the people. But giving discretion to government 
officials creates a new problem, which is that they use their powers to advance 
their own personal interests, or the interests of favored families, clans, or other 
groups. 
 
The more significant development was the theory of the mixed 
constitution, which was famously advocated by Polybius.21 A mixed constitution 
is one in which different social groups—typically, the masses, the aristocracy, and 
a hereditary ruler—are given influence over governance. The mixed constitution 
ensured that any group could veto political outcomes that it disapproved of. In the 
Roman Republic, for example, the Senate was dominated by aristocrats, while 
certain important offices were reserved for plebeians. Assemblies gave ordinary 
people a voice by virtue of their number, but electoral procedures gave 
advantages to voters with greater wealth.22 
 
18 Hansen, supra note, at 307. 
19 Id. at 308. 
20 See J.A. North, Democratic Politics in Republican Rome 126 Past & Present 3, 17 (1990), 
available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/650807 (“Above all, they exercised an exclusive control as 
magistrates, senators and priests over the ceremonial of public religious activity, and hence over 
access to the gods and to divine legitimation of all human activities.”). 
21 Polybius, supra note; see also Aristotle, Politics, Book 3 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Paul Negri & 
John Berseth eds., 2000). 
22 Polybius, supra note. 
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The Roman Republic lasted centuries, and was a spectacular success by 
the standards of the time. Its mixed system effectively created supermajority rule 
that ensured that ordinary people could influence government policy but not 
expropriate the property of smaller groups, including the wealthy, which limited 
conflict and civil war for many centuries.23 But the large number of veto points 
led to gridlock, which powerful rulers from time to time resolved with extra-
constitutional acts, leading eventually to civil war, dictatorship, and then 
empire.24 
 
B. The Modern Period 
 
1. The Attractions of Supermajority Rule 
 
 The next step in the development of voting systems took place in Italian 
communes in the Middle Ages. These communes used supermajority rules to elect 
their leaders—sometimes unanimity, but usually 2/3 or some other fraction 
considerably larger than the majority.25 In the Church, canon law provided that 
many decisions would be made by majority rule, but a complicated set of laws 
permitted outvoted minorities to appeal to higher officials and prevail if they 
could persuade those officials that the majority vote was contaminated in some 
way—by the personal interests or motives of voters in the majority, or simply 
because it was wrong.26 Under the doctrine of maior et sanior pars, a minority 
could outvote a majority if the minority contained people with superior judgment, 
such as those with greater experience and wisdom—a form of weighted voting 
that we will discuss later.27 In England, the House of Commons began to use 
majority rule in the fifteenth century, but Great Britain had a classic mixed 
Constitution—with the aristocracy able to exert power through the House of 
Lords, and the King able to act on his own—so that in practice political outcomes 
must have satisfied an implicit supermajority rule (putting aside Cromwell’s 
dictatorship). 
 
23 See Schwartzberg, supra note, at 39-46. 
24 See Eric A. Posner, The Constitution of the Roman Republic: A Political Economy Perspective 
(U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 540; U of Chicago, Public Law & 
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 327), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1701981. 
25 Heinberg, supra note at 58; Arthur M. Wolfson, The Ballot and Other Forms of Voting in Italian 
Communes, 5 Am. Hist. Rev. 3 (1899). Supermajorities rules also existed in ancient times—and 
effectively in Rome as note above—but become more explicit in this period. See Schwartzberg, 
supra note, at 44-46, 49-51. 
26 Heinberg, supra note at 59-60. 
27 John Gilbert Heinberg, Theories of Majority Rule, 26 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 452, 456 (1932); 
Schwartzberg, supra note, at 52-58. 
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 What accounted for the growing popularity of supermajority rule? A 
plausible answer is that supermajority rule allows the majority to govern while 
giving some protection to people with intense interests when they are unable to 
form a majority coalition. Supermajority rules protect minorities, and thus they 
enable people with intense preferences to block acts that harm them if they form a 
large enough minority or can form a large enough minority coalition with other 
interests. Supermajority rule may thus seem like an improvement over majority 
rule.28 One can thus speculate that supermajority rules appealed to political 
leaders, constitutional founders, and the general public for two reasons. First, 
people in the majority today know that they may be in the minority tomorrow. 
They give up the chance of prevailing by a weak majority in return for gaining the 
ability to block weak majorities—a tradeoff that may reduce the risk of purely 
redistributive but inefficient outcomes that favor one group sometimes and 
another group at other times, thus giving no one a net gain, while reducing total 
wealth over time. Second, people with intense preferences who repeatedly are 
victimized in the political process have strong incentives to rebel or secede; 
supermajority rule institutionalizes their power so that it flows through peaceful 
political channels.29 
 
 Stronger rules—like rule by unanimity or consensus—also can block 
tyranny of the majority, but they suffer from a significant disadvantage: they 
cause gridlock. The advantage of unanimity rule is that projects are possible only 
if they benefit all members of the group. The disadvantage is that any individual 
can hold out, preventing a project from being approved unless she receives a 
payoff from other members of the group. Since other individuals face the same 
incentives, everyone can hold out, resulting in impasse and failure.30 This is why 
unanimity rule is rarely used in political groups. When it is used, it supports only 
the thinnest forms of cooperation. International institutions frequently use 
unanimity rule or variations of it. Action by the Security Council requires 
unanimity among the five permanent members. The Law of the Sea Authority 
also uses supermajority rule and vetoes to protect the largest countries.31 Because 
of mutual suspicion between governments, the risk of decisions that benefit some 
states at the expense of others is considered intolerable. This risk is minimized 
28 See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 Tex. L. 
Rev. 703 (2002) who build a constitutional theory around the ideal of supermajority rule. 
29 Supermajority rule developed in certain contexts where it favored those in power (at least, 
relative to majority rule). See Schwartzberg, supra note, at 59-70. The bias toward the status quo 
would clearly benefit those who did well in the status quo. 
30 See George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems 
with Many Agents, 57 Rev. Econ. Stud. 351 (1990) for a formalization of this argument. 
31 See Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Voting Rules in International Institutions, Chicago J. 
Inter’l L. (forthcoming 2014). 
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with strong decision rules that also cause gridlock, which is considered a 
reasonable price to pay.32 
 
 Hold-out is more difficult under supermajority rule than under unanimity 
rule, but supermajority rule is more cumbersome than majority rule, as experience 
in the U.S. senate shows. The series of recent crises over the debt ceiling show the 
hold-out power created even by relatively weak minority protections, which 
enable a determined minority to block projects supported by the majority even 
when these projects are clearly in the public interest. Furthermore, supermajority 
rules do not prevent a “conservative” tyranny of the majority in which legislation 
bringing great benefits to a minority (such as civil rights laws for racial or ethnic 
minorities, or same-sex marriage for gays and lesbians) is blocked by a majority. 
Indeed, supermajority rules discourage minorities from forming coalitions with 
each other to advance their interests by raising the size of the coalition needed to 
pass new legislation. Still, supermajority rule may be a tolerable compromise—
reducing the worst excesses of tyranny of the majority without shutting down 
government altogether.33 
 
 Supermajority rule takes many forms. Sometimes, it is explicit; 
sometimes, other voting rules effectively require a supermajority. It can stand 
alone or it can be joined with still other rules that protect particular interests. The 
U.S. Constitution, drafted by men who were intensely aware of the history of 
democratic institutions and their problems, contains numerous examples of 
supermajority rules. A supermajority of the Senate—two-thirds—must approve a 
treaty before a president can ratify it. A supermajority of the Senate is needed to 
block a filibuster. Two thirds of each house are necessary to overcome the 
president’s veto. These are all explicit examples of supermajority rule.34 It is 
commonly said that one of the purposes of the constitutional drafters was to 
protect minorities—for example, the minority of Americans living in the South, or 
in rural areas, or creditors, or those with substantial property holdings. A better 
way of putting this point is that the founders realized that these groups had intense 
32 Majority rule exists in bodies like the General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council, 
which lack the authority to make law, and international judicial bodies, which generally gain 
jurisdiction only with the consent of affected states. See id. 
33 See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy (1962). But see Anthony J. McGann, The Tyranny of the 
Supermajority: How Majority Rule Protects Minorities, 16 J. Theoretical Pol. 53 (2004) (arguing 
that supermajority rule provides less protection to minorities than majority rule does because it 
makes it difficult for minorities to form coalitions with other minorities to advance their interests 
through new legislation). 
34 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution (2013) 
(describing supermajority rules in the Constitution). 
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interests but because they were minorities, could not depend on majority rule to 
protect them. Supermajority rule was thus necessary to provide such protection 
because a constitutional order would not survive without the support of these 
groups. 
 
 Another example is bicameralism. At first sight, the requirement of a 
majority in both houses in order to pass a bill may seem like a (double) example 
of majority rule rather than supermajority rule. But a simple majority in the House 
and a simple majority in the Senate will normally be possible only if a 
supermajority of Americans approve the policy. The reason is that different 
groups of people elect representatives and senators. Except under unusual 
conditions, the median voter of one group and the median voter of another group 
will be different, which means that a supermajority of one group or the other will 
be necessary to approve the bill.35 And then because the president can veto a bill, 
and courts can strike it down, the U.S. Constitution builds in additional points 
where minorities may be able to block legislation—if the minority manages to 
elect the president (which is difficult but not impossible) or exerts influence over 
the judiciary or elements of it (which can occur when a long dominant party that 
has made many judicial appointments finally loses power). And then again the 
federal system can protect a national minority that dominates a state from 
legislation that the national government might like to impose on the state but 
cannot because authority to legislate for that policy area lies with the state. Today, 
a temporary political majority—even one that captures the presidency and both 
houses—must contend not only with the courts, but also with an entrenched 
bureaucracy, which can block popular legislation that it disapproves of, or water 
down its effect.36 Even dictatorship, oligarchy, and aristocracy can be systems 
designed to protect minority interests. Oligarchy classically protects the interests 
of the wealthy minority; aristocracy protects the interests of ancient families or 
other groups with historical privileges. Dictatorships often rest on the support of 
powerful minorities that fear rule of the majority—for example, the Sunnis in Iraq 
under Saddam Hussein (where the majority consists of Shiites), and the Christians 
and Alawites in Syria under Hafez and Bashar al-Assad (where the majority 
consists of Sunnis). 
 
35 See John J. Coleman, Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness, 93 
Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 821 (1999). 
36 Various other rules, some in the Constitution, others customary, protect minority interests. An 
interesting class of such rules are “submajority” voting rules, which give minorities extra power to 
protect themselves by giving them some control over the agenda. See Adrian Vermeule, 
Mechanisms of Democracy 85-115 (2007). 
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 Constitutional systems can also protect minority interests by giving them 
more votes. The U.S. Constitution did just that by giving slave-holding states 
extra representation in the House based on the number of slaves in their 
populations—the notorious 3/5 rule.37 This rule protected states with intense 
minority interests (in the preservation of slavery) from the weaker interests (in the 
abolition of slavery) of a majority of states. The rule that states elect two senators 
regardless of the size of their population can also be understood as one that gives 
greater voting power to people in low-population states, thus again protecting 
intense minority interests. Similar rules can be found in corporate governance 
today. Shareholders with larger stakes in a corporation have more votes than 
shareholders with smaller stakes—voting is typically based on number of shares 
owned rather than status as a shareholder. Voting systems in international 
organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund also give 
more weight to countries that contribute the most money to those organizations, 
thus protecting their contributions from expropriation by the poorer countries that 
form the majority of their membership.38 
 
John Stuart Mill argued that educated people should be given more votes 
than uneducated people because educated people understand the public good 
better than uneducated people do.39 Others have advocated property qualifications 
over the years based on similar reasoning: people with property have more at 
stake in political choices, and therefore should have greater voting power.40 
37 Or, looked at differently, it gives greater weight to northern states given that 2/5 of the slave 
population in southern states were not counted. In other words, if the baseline is that the South 
should have voting power in the national government that is commensurate to its fraction of the 
total national population, the rule gives extra voting power to the North; if the baseline is that the 
South should have voting power in the national government that is commensurate to its fraction of 
the national voting population (thus excluding slaves), the rule gives extra voting power to the 
South. 
38 Yet another example is consociationalism, a constitutional form where different groups (for 
example, different religious or ethnic groups) are guaranteed proportional representation in 
government, including in the executive, and decisions are usually made by consensus. Examples 
include Lebanon and Bosnia and Herzegovina. John Calhoun advocated a type of 
consociationalism when he argued that the United States should have a dual executive consisting 
of a Northern and Southern representative. See Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 21 
World Pol. 207 (1969). 
39 See John Stuart Mill, Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform (1859), reprinted in The Collected 
Works of John Stuart Mill, 19 (John M. Robson ed., 1977). In common with modern approaches 
as well as empirical evidence, we assume that people vote in their self-interest, and hence the 
voting system must be designed so as to aggregate information and preferences. However, strong 
empirical evidence suggests that the educated typically have more intense information and 
preferences and thus might optimally receive, on average, a greater weight. See Raymond E. 
Wolfinger & Steven J. Rosenstone, Who Votes? (1980). 
40 Property qualifications for voting were common in the states at the time of the founding. 
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Similar reasoning justified the denial of the franchise to women, who were 
thought to lack the judgment to make political decisions and were otherwise 
protected by the votes of their fathers or husbands, and to the inhabitants of 
colonies, who were believed incapable of self-government because they lacked 
intelligence or proper traditions. In all these cases, the fear was that the a virtuous 
or wise minority with strong interests would be outvoted by ordinary people who, 
more numerous than the elites, would have greater voting power under 
unweighted majority rule. 
 
Weighted voting is rarely used today in political decisions. The older 
justifications are now seen as biased, bigoted, and plain wrong. But, even putting 
aside the questionable empirical assumptions of their proponents, weighted voting 
is not a good way for protecting minority interests.41 The problem is that people 
with extra votes can use those votes to advance their interests even when those 
interests are weak and they are affected less by a policy than others. The problem 
is familiar in corporate governance: people who own multiple shares of a 
corporation and therefore enjoy commensurate voting power that they can use to 
protect their interests, can also use this same voting power to expropriate value 
from other shareholders.42 For example, a person who owns 51 percent of a 
corporation can in theory push through a merger that benefits her because she 
owns the target company and can insist on an above-market price, in the process 
harming the owners of the other 49 percent. The courts try to deter this kind of 
expropriation by giving minorities the right to challenge the merger in court and 
obtain a fair valuation.43 But then judges must determine the value of the 
corporation—a hard thing to do, and in tension with the idea that corporations 
should be private in the first place. 
 
 Moreover, all major democratic systems are representative democracies, 
not popular democracies, and representative democracy protects minority interests 
to a greater extent than popular democracy does. Representatives may themselves 
understand the dangers of acceding to majority interests too easily; they may also 
be more responsive to well-organized minorities, which can contribute cash, than 
to the majority, which may have difficulty coordinating and enforcing its 
interests. The founders gave senators six-year terms in order to insulate them from 
public opinion and enable them to check the more democratically sensitive House. 
41 As advocated by Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990) (arguing that 
women should have a veto over issues that affect them). 
42 See Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance, U. 
Chicago L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014). 
43 See Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442 (Del. Ch. 2011) (holding that a 
corporation “must pay ‘in cash’ an amount equal to the ‘fair value’ of the fractional interests.”). 
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 The framers of the U.S. constitution recognized the dangers of majority 
rule. During the period of the Articles of Confederation, state governments broke 
contracts, redistributed wealth, and engaged in other policies that benefited the 
majority at the expense of the propertied minority.44 Aware also of the repeated 
attempts by Roman political leaders like the Gracchi and Caesar to obtain power 
by promising to redistribute wealth to the masses, the framers implemented 
numerous anti-majoritarian rules in the Constitution. These included several 
mentioned above: the separation of government powers into three branches that 
exercised partial vetoes and drew their power from different constituencies; the 
further division of the legislature into an upper and lower house; numerous 
provisions for the indirect election of powerful figures including the president and 
senators; the appointment of others, such as judges; explicit supermajority voting 
rules; federalism; extreme supermajority rules for amending the Constitution; and 
so on.45 These rules did not just protect propertied interests from majority rule. 
They also protected sectional interests—particularly, those of merchants and slave 
owners. 
 
 Some commentators celebrate this system of supermajoritarianism,46 but 
there is very little reason to believe that it is optimal or even close to optimal. For 
one thing, even if rule by supermajority is superior to rule by majority, the range 
of supermajority rules between majority and unanimity is infinite; no one has any 
idea whether the optimal supermajority rule is 51 percent or 99 percent or 
anywhere in between—and the optimal rule could vary for different areas of 
policy, and over time in response to demographic changes.47 And then it is 
possible (if decision costs and hence the risk of gridlock is high enough) that pure 
majority rule, or even submajority rule, is better than supermajority rule. 
Whatever the merits of supermajority rule, it is clearly a very crude way to protect 
minority interests since a particular minority may not have enough votes even 
under supermajority rule to block adverse legislation, while another minority may 
have enough votes to block legislation that benefits the public interest and does 
not harm the minority or does so very little.48 A minority of 32 percent cannot 
44 See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Righteous Anger at the Wicked States: The Meaning of the 
Founders’ Constitution (2005); Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An 
Interpretive History of the Continental Congress (1979); and Woody Holton, Unruly Americans 
and the Origins of the Constitution (2007). 
45 See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 Yale L.J. 1286, 1293-97 (2012). 
46 Notably, McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note. 
47 Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator 
Problem, in Comparative Constitutional Design (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2012). 
48 See McGann, supra note (arguing that supermajority rule can hurt minorities by raising the costs 
of forming coalitions with other minorities in order to overturn laws passed by majorities). 
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protect itself under a 2/3 rule, and a minority of 34 percent can threaten to block 
legislation that benefits the public unless given a payoff. 
 
 Thus, for all its popularity, supermajority rule is fundamentally flawed. It 
protects intense minority interests only when those interests are held by enough 
people to form a blocking minority. It enables minorities with weak (or strong) 
interests to block laws that benefit the majority more than it harms the minority—
creating gridlock. And it does not help people with strong interests when the 
status quo harms them; indeed, it hurts them by making it more difficult for them 
to cobble together a large enough majority with other groups in order to change 
the status quo. 
 
 All of these problems influenced the development of American 
constitutional law. In response to the problem of gridlock, over a long period the 
U.S. constitutional system adjusted itself by shifting power away from the states, 
and to the national government; and, within the national government, away from 
Congress and to a large bureaucracy controlled by the executive.49 Gridlock 
nonetheless remains a significant problem today. 
 
 The problem of the status quo harming minorities with intense interests 
created even greater difficulties. Racial, ethnic, and religious minorities both 
suffered from discrimination in day-to-day life, and could not obtain legislative 
relief because they were outvoted; in many cases, particularly that of African-
Americans, voters in the majority at the state level supported laws that weakened 
or eliminated the franchise of the minority. When African-Americans finally 
joined with northern whites to form majority coalitions at the national level in the 
1940s and 1950s, supermajority rules protected the rights of another minority—
southern whites—at their expense, as southern senators used the filibuster to 
defeat civil rights legislation that enjoyed majority support among the public.50 
Supermajority rules in this case entrenched a conservative minority, blocking 
reforms that would tremendously benefit a smaller minority. 
 
2. Judicial Review of Legislation 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, federal courts stepped in to 
rectify the problem of tyrannical conservative majorities (or large minorities) by 
recognizing the rights of minorities to effective political representation. This 
49 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian 
Republic (2010) (discussing the rise of executive power). 
50 Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Passage of Power (2012) (describing the 
battles over civil rights legislation). 
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would turn out to be the greatest contribution of American legal and political 
thought to the problems of majority rule. Of course, the original constitution used 
the language of rights, but the constitution was not oriented toward the problem of 
minority racial and ethnic groups, and even if religious rights appeared in the first 
amendment, it was not clearly understood from the beginning that the courts 
would have a strong role in preventing the majority from passing laws that harm 
minority religious groups. Today, judicial enforcement of the political rights of 
politically vulnerable minorities is taken for granted.  
 
The doctrine that courts developed for this purpose is complex; a 
simplified description will be adequate here. Laws are presumptively enforceable 
because they reflect the will of the majority. But if they burden historically 
vulnerable minority groups (or “suspect classes,” an ill-defined concept that at 
least includes racial and ethnic groups), then a court will strike them down unless 
the government can provide a strong and persuasive reason that the burden is 
justified by the public gains.51 In practice, courts approve such laws only if they 
are designed to benefit rather than harm the minority group (affirmative action)52 
or (in the case of religious groups) do not target minority religious practices.53 
 
 This approach is firmly entrenched in American legal thought, with 
disputes only along the margins. A small literature objects that the preoccupation 
with rights distorts political discourse, but it has exerted little influence.54 
Longstanding worries that judicial review interferes with democratic values, 
blocks publicly beneficial legislation, and can lead to backlash, have never gained 
a foothold.55 Conservatives and Republicans originally opposed the extension of 
judicially enforced rights to minorities in the 1950s and 1960s, but today accept 
the principle that laws with racial classifications are unconstitutional.  
 
51 See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (finding that 
permit requirements for a mentally ill nursing home rested on an “irrational prejudice” against 
residents). 
52 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding the special admission program 
constitutional for benefitting those based on race). 
53 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding the state may deny unemployment 
compensation to those who use peyote for religious reasons when the law does not attempt to 
regulate freedom of religion). 
54 See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 1-17 
(1991). For a discussion and criticism of this view, see Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Cost of Rights 158-61 (1999). 
55 See, e.g., Jeremey Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999); Adrian Vermeule, Law and the 
Limits of Reason (2008). 
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 We can see the problems with judicially enforceable rights anew by 
considering them from the perspective of the problems with majority rule. Recall 
that the major advantage of majority rule is that it facilitates laws and other public 
projects that advance the well-being of most of the public (reflected by the 
interest of the median voter) by minimizing bargaining costs (relative to 
supermajority rule or rule by unanimity or consensus). But the disadvantage is 
that it permits majorities to expropriate from minorities, and forces all groups to 
expend resources in struggles to avoid exclusion from the majority coalition. At 
first sight, judicially enforceable rights seem like an ideal solution. They permit 
the majority to continue to legislate for the public good, while prohibiting them 
only from passing laws that harm minority interests. 
 
 But this argument is too crude. It reaches its conclusion by assuming that 
only two kinds of laws exist: those legitimate laws that advance the public interest 
without hurting the minority in any way, or perhaps only trivially; and those 
illegitimate laws that benefit the majority only through expropriation of minority 
interests. However, most laws fall between these two extremes. These laws both 
plausibly benefit the majority and also harm a minority. 
 
 Consider some familiar examples: 
 
• A gang-loitering or stop-and-frisk law that reduces crime but disrupts the 
lives and activities of mostly minority men. 
• A toughening of visa requirements that reduces illegal immigration but 
also disrupts cross-border relationships of immigrants and their foreign 
relatives and friends. 
• An anti-same-sex marriage law like Proposition 8, which reinforces 
traditional notions of marriage supported by most Americans but that 
deprives gays and lesbians of advantages enjoyed by opposite-sex couples. 
• Sanitation and anti-drug laws that interfere with religious rituals of 
minority religious groups. 
• Money-tracing laws that restrict money-laundering and terrorist financing 
but burden Americans of Arab descent that do business in the Middle East. 
• Voter identification laws that reduce voting fraud and enhance confidence 
in elections but deter voting among the poor. 
• Zoning laws that enhance public spaces and increase property values but 
drive out a small number of low-income residents who cannot afford 
higher rents. 
• Reduction of public funding for inner-city projects (mainly hurting low-
income African-Americans) for the benefit of taxpayers generally. 
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• Eminent domain projects where a city forces the sale of several private 
properties, possibly at below value to the owners, in order to build a park 
or revitalize the downtown. 
 
 People hold different and often strong opinions about these laws but the 
laws all pose the same dilemma. A particular law helps (or plausibly helps) the 
majority and possibly the public at large, including even the affected minority, or 
certain members of it. But the law also puts a burden on the minority, a burden 
that may seem unfair and in some cases sufficiently egregious as to throw into 
question the desirability of the law in question. The question repeatedly arises, at 
what point do the benefits enjoyed by the majority justify the burdens imposed on 
the minority? 
 
 The Court’s approach is plainly simplistic. Some laws do not explicitly 
discriminate against minorities—and might not be motivated by animus—and yet 
may impose a burden on minorities that is unfair or excessive. Critics of many of 
the laws described above make this argument. A stop-and-frisk law may make 
sense in theory, they say; but it puts an excessive burden on minorities.56 And at 
least in theory there may be laws that explicitly burden a minority that may be 
publicly justified. The dissenting justices in United States v. Windsor held that 
view about the Defense of Marriage Act, which denied federal marriage benefits 
to same-sex couples who were legally married under state law.57 Finally, laws that 
explicitly or implicitly discriminate against minority groups which are not suspect 
classes because not the subject of historical discrimination may nonetheless be 
highly objectionable from a social standpoint because they expropriate benefits 
from a group without producing equal social gain. Such laws include those that 
discriminate against regional interests (such as farmers or people living in small 
towns) or social classes, or any other group that fails to form a majority 
coalition—homeowners, or national-park visitors, or commuters, or parents with 
young children.58 
 
56 See The New York Times, Injustices of Stop and Frisk, N.Y. TIMES (May 13. 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/14/opinion/injustices-of-stop-and-frisk.html?_r=0.  
57 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
58 An oddity here is that courts rarely try to determine whether a particular group holds political 
power on a case by case basis. For example, an ethnic or racial minority may be the majority in a 
city that passes an ordinance that is challenged in court, but if the law incorporates racial 
classifications that appear to burden that group it will be subject to strict scrutiny. See Dan M. 
Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Forward: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 Geo. L.J. 
1153 (1998) (arguing that Supreme Court doctrine that banned overly vague laws used for crime 
control but capable of discriminatory enforcement should not be applied when minority groups 
support those laws). 
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 The Court have struggled with these questions, and in recent years the 
doctrinal structure has reflected these strains. Two examples illustrate this 
problem well. First, in cases challenging laws that burden gays and lesbians, the 
Supreme Court has refused to recognize this group as a suspect class, so 
technically a discriminatory law is constitutional as long as it is rational, and 
under the conventional rules, that would almost always be the case. Yet the Court 
has demanded that governments provide substantial evidence that these laws 
advance concrete interests—in health or order, for example, rather than purely 
moral interests—and governments have had trouble meeting this burden. 
However, if the rational basis test ordinarily required persuasive social-science 
evidence that a law advances a particular interest, few laws would be 
constitutional. Social science evidence is usually extremely weak. The only really 
persuasive evidence comes from randomized experiments, but these are costly, 
rare, and difficult to generalize from. Observational studies, no matter how high 
their quality, are easy to criticize; and usually a consensus will come into place 
only after dozens have been performed. As a result, the social-science evidence 
that could be cited to support even laws that are widely accepted—say, 
imprisonment of burglars, or taxation of polluters—is weak, and when 
government embarks on innovative regulatory projects, the evidence will often be 
non-existent. Thus, if courts were to demand strong social science evidence for 
any law that was challenged, we would not have many laws. That is why the 
rational-basis test was used in the first place. The Supreme Court ended up 
striking down the Defense of Marriage Act because it believed that opposition to 
same-sex marriage reflected “animus” when in fact it reflected moral 
disagreement.59 It seems likely that the real basis of the decision was the 
majority’s view that DOMA imposed significant burdens on one group of people 
that were not justified by whatever advantages it might have had for others. 
 
 Affirmative action provides a second example. Affirmative action laws 
typically provide that African-Americans, Latinos, and certain other minority 
groups receive special privileges, usually the right to educational and employment 
opportunities that are denied to others with superior qualifications. These laws sit 
uneasily with the premise that rights protect minorities because the laws 
discriminate—more-or-less explicitly—against various minority groups, such as 
Asian-Americans, who are routinely denied educational slots for which they are 
apparently qualified. While doctrine permits facially discriminatory laws or laws 
with explicit racial classifications that serve a “compelling government interest,” 
the type of social scientific evidence that courts normally require in these 
59 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding that the Defense of Marriage Act was 
unconstitutional in part on grounds of improper animus). 
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circumstances fails to show that affirmative action benefits the public,60 and as a 
result judicial support for affirmative action, never enthusiastic, has been 
waning.61 Yet affirmative action could be easily seen as a reasonable, pragmatic 
policy of the sort that the government regularly experiments with, and justifiably 
so. 
 
 The basic divide in modern constitutional jurisprudence can be seen from 
the standpoint of preference intensity. The liberal justices on the Supreme Court 
worry about harms to the strong liberty or dignity interests of racial and ethnic 
minorities—African-Americans, Hispanics—and vulnerable groups, like 
prisoners, indigent people, political dissidents, and others on the margin of 
society.62 Thus, liberal jurisprudence has centered on the Equal Protection Clause, 
the Due Process Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and the First Amendment.63 The 
conservative justices on the Court also worry about majority exploitation—but 
they worry about the older type of exploitation that the founders worried about, 
namely, the expropriation of property. Indeed, the conservative view that rights 
are needed to protect property from expropriation long predates the liberal view 
that rights are need to protect the liberty interests of ethnic minorities and other 
vulnerable groups. Thus, the conservative justices have focused on strengthening 
the Takings Clause of the Constitution, which limits the power of the government 
to take property or issue regulations that reduce property values, without paying 
compensation.64 They have also turned the Due Process Clause and the First 
Amendment to their advantage, using them to protect businesses against excessive 
sanctions and regulation of advertising.65 Even the recent development of gun 
60 Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 
Stan. L. Rev. (2004).  
61 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (directing lower court to reexamine an 
affirmative action program). 
62 See John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980).  
63 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding that the public education doctrine 
of “separate but equal” is “inherently unequal” under the Equal Protection Clause.); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a state criminal abortion statute that excepts only lifesaving 
procedures, without regard of other interests or stages of pregnancy, violates the Due Process 
Clause); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding that a citizen talking in a public 
telephone booth had an entitlement to assume privacy under the Fourth Amendment); New York 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (arguing that the vagueness of national 
security should not “abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment.”). 
64 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 715 (2010). 
65 BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (finding punitive damages that attempt to deter 
activities both in and outside the state are excessive); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
(finding that restrictions on corporate independent expenditures are invalid under the First 
Amendment).  
21 
 
                                                 
rights can be seen as protection for a passionate gun-loving minorities.66 The 
liberals and conservatives agree that tyranny of the majority requires a judicial 
response, disagreeing only on which minorities deserve protection. 
 
 This disagreement in turn derives from assumptions about whose interests 
are stronger. For conservatives, property owners have strong and legitimate 
interests in the enjoyment of their property, which is constantly being threatened 
by governments controlled by lower-income people who seek redistribution. For 
liberals, various minority groups and women have strong and legitimate interests 
in not being discriminated against by governments frequently beholden to 
majorities of white men. 
 
 Courts are in a difficult position. It is plausible that all these people care 
deeply about their interests, but the real question is how, in the context of specific 
controversies, to value interests that litigants allege are strong and are badly 
harmed by laws and policies. The actual extent to which people care about their 
property rights, or rights not to be discriminated against (for example, through 
excessive stopping-and-frisking) is simply unknown. That information cannot be 
elicited in a reliable way, and so judges must fall back on their intuitions, or social 
science evidence that is almost always weak and contestable.67 
 
 Judicial review also depends on judges being motivated to protect 
minorities that actually lack political power and not the majority or minorities that 
systematically prevail in the political process because they are well-organized and 
influential.68 But there is no guarantee that judges will act in this way. Judges are 
appointed by the government, and in practice tend to advance the interests of 
whatever government that appoints them. They end up protecting minorities 
mainly because judges remain in power long after the coalition that supported the 
government that appoints them has collapsed. 
 
Seen in this way, judicial review is just another form of supermajority 
rule—one where the supermajority threshold is effectively a function of political 
configurations from a generation earlier.69 Minorities associated with Party X will 
66 D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding a ban on handgun possession in the home a 
violation of the Second Amendment). 
67 See infra, on the controversy over contingent valuation. 
68 There are other criticisms of this approach (famously championed by John Hart Ely, Democracy 
and Distrust (1980)), focusing on the difficulty with determining whether a group has in fact been 
deprived of political power or deprived too an excessive or unfair degree. See, e.g., Laurence H. 
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063 
(1980); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985). 
69 Cf. Levinson, supra note. 
22 
 
                                                 
have greater supermajoritarian protection if Party X was in power in the recent 
past; otherwise, they will not. The connection between judicial review and 
supermajoritarianism is clearer in other countries than in the United States. In 
most countries, legislatures can overturn high court constitutional interpretations 
by passing laws or engaging in other procedures that require a supermajority or 
compliance with rules that protect minority interests.70 And in the United States 
as well as other countries, a supermajority can usually reverse constitutional 
holdings through the amendment process.71 But, as we have seen, supermajority 
rule is a crude and unsatisfactory way of protecting minority interests.  
 
In the United States, judicial review owes its prestige among liberals 
because from the 1950s to the 1970s the Supreme Court protected minorities that 
liberals care about and who (not coincidentally) played important political roles in 
the coalition that supported the Democratic Party—above all, African-
Americans.72 At that time, conservatives argued that the Supreme Court should 
not protect minorities but should defer to the political process.73 Today, the 
prestige of the Supreme Court has risen among conservatives because it 
increasingly protects minorities that conservatives care about—property owners, 
businesses, and gun owners, among others.74 These groups have played important 
roles in the Republican coalition. Meanwhile, liberals increasingly argue that the 
Supreme Court should be more deferential to the political process.75 Like a pure 
supermajority rule, judicial review as practiced in the United States provides 
minorities with an instrument for protecting their interests; but unlike a pure 
supermajority rule, there is a temporal component to judicial review because of 
the lag between the appointment of judges and most of their rulings.76 
70 See Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & James Melton, The Lifespan of Written Constitutions 
(Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Law & Economics Workshop, Paper No. 3, 2008) available at 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/berkeley_law_econ/Spring2008/3/. 
71 Id. 
72 Ely, supra note . 
73 Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(Harvard 1977). Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 San 
Diego L Rev 823 (1986). Also see, Steven G. Calabresi & Lauren Pope, Judge Robert H. Bork and 
Constitutional Change: An Essay on Ollman v Evans, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 155 (2013) 
(https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/page/judge-robert-h-bork-and-constitutional-change-essay-
ollman-v-evans#5N). 
74 Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985). 
75 E.g., Mark Tushnet, Why the Constitution Matters (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a 
Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (1999); Larry D. Kramer, The People 
Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2005). 
76 For reasons of space, we have ignored other forms of minority protection that are common in 
foreign countries, including proportional representation and other power-sharing arrangements. 
For a brief discussion, see Levinson, supra note, at 1307-11; Sujit Choudhry, Bridging 
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A final point is that it should be easy to see how judicial review, if it can 
be properly practiced, reconciles democratic commitments and protection of 
minorities. The problem with democracy is not so much that majorities win. It is 
that majorities win when their interests are weaker than the interests of 
minorities.77 If judges can value the interests of minorities and protect them only 
when they are stronger than the majority’s interests, then striking down legislation 
may be inconsistent with majority rule, but it is not inconsistent with welfare-
maximization or a more robust conception of democracy that is oriented toward 
welfare-maximization rather than the victory of the majority over a temporary or 
entrenched minority. To the extent that the public recognizes this, it will rationally 
lend its support in the long term to a court that strikes down legislation. 
 
3. Executive Discretion and Technocracy 
 
We should also mention a final common method for aggregating 
preferences in a way that takes account of those who have intense preferences. In 
the United States and many other countries, policies are frequently made by 
bureaucracies or government agencies rather than by the legislature. These 
agencies have considerable discretion to choose policies that advance the public 
good as a whole rather than specific interests, and thus to give greater weight to 
intense preferences, even if held by only a minority, than to weak preferences 
held by the majority. If they are controlled by the chief executive, and if the chief 
executive has strong electoral incentives to advance the public good, the agencies 
may be motivated to choose regulations on the basis of aggregate preferences.78 
 
The problem is knowing what those preferences are. Since the 1980s, U.S. 
regulatory agencies have increasingly relied on cost-benefit analysis.79 Using 
cost-benefit analysis, an agency evaluates a proposed regulation or project—like a 
pollution control regulation—by determining whether the public benefits exceed 
Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design for Divided 
Societies, in Constitutional Design for Divided Societies (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008). 
77 Cf. Barry Friedman, The Will of the People (2009), who argues, in a similar spirit, that the 
Court retains public support by provoking debate over significant issues rather than systematically 
ruling against the majority. 
78 In a similar vein, prosecutorial discretion allows the executive to avoid prosecuting people who 
commit morals crimes—acts that society disapproves of but does not cause harm to anyone—such 
as sodomy, prostitution, and drug use. The tradition was to tolerate this behavior unless it was 
flaunted; in this way, the executive accommodated people with intense interests in the activity 
while otherwise enforcing the weaker preferences of the majority. On prosecutorial discretion 
generally, see William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice (2013). 
79 Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis 10-20 (2006). 
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the (usually) private costs. Costs can be easily determined: they are simply the 
financial cost of installing a scrubber or supplying workers with protective masks, 
plus costs attributable to lost sales if the price increases. Determining benefits is 
trickier. If the regulation improves the quality of air, the agency might determine 
benefits by calculating avoided medical costs or property damage. But often the 
benefits include general amenities (such as a clear rather than smoggy sky) or 
avoided mortality, which are intrinsically hard to value. Agencies have developed 
controversial methods for valuing these goods, such as contingent valuation, 
where they simply ask people how much they would be willing to pay for a public 
good. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis addresses the problem of intense preferences by 
measuring them in terms of willingness-to-pay. Suppose the question is whether 
to impose a strict or weak pollution regulation. Asthmatics and others sensitive to 
pollution are willing to pay a great deal for a low level of pollution, while other 
people may not. The regulator aggregates the amounts that everyone is willing to 
pay in order to determine the correct level of strictness. Thus, even if asthmatics 
form a small minority, their preferences will influence the outcome by causing the 
regulator to choose a higher level of pollution control than it would if it chose the 
optimum for the majority. In this way, cost-benefit analysis improves on majority 
voting, which in this context would result in no (rather than moderate) pollution 
control. 
 
But cost-benefit analysis suffers from numerous problems. As noted, 
while regulators can sometimes derive valuations from market behavior, they 
often cannot—precisely because government projects are used to generate public 
goods where markets fail. Even when market valuations can be used, they reflect 
the preferences of marginal, rather than average, consumers and are thus 
extremely sensitive to spurious factors such as the state of technology. 
 
Given these problems, agencies often run so-called “Contingent 
Valuation” (CV) surveys that ask individuals to report their personal valuations 
for (usually public) goods.80 Contingent valuation surveys cannot guarantee that 
people answer questions honestly or after thinking carefully about how public 
resources should be used. In fact, participants in such surveys never have an 
incentive to tell the truth unless they expect the survey to have no impact on 
public policy; but if this is true, why run the survey in the first place? 81 Empirical 
80 Robert C. Mitchell & Richard T. Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The Contingent 
Valuation Method (1989). 
81 Richard T. Carson & Theodore Groves, Incentive and Informational Properties of Preference 
Questions, in The International Handbook on Non-Market Environmental Valuation (2007). 
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evidence indicates that in practice these surveys deliver information of little 
value.82 
 
In addition, wealth disparities can distort the valuations elicited by cost-
benefit analysis—the rich are willing to pay more for goods than the poor are, 
even when those goods do not make the rich better off than the poor.83 And, 
finally, the executive branch of the government is not necessarily well-motivated 
to use cost-benefit analysis honestly. When President Reagan ordered regulators 
to use cost-benefit analysis in 1981, critics argued that he was trying to create 
bureaucratic hurdles to regulation.84 And then when President Clinton renewed 
the order in the 1990s, critics argued that he did so for public relations reasons 
only, and that his agencies manipulated cost-benefit analysis to rationalize 
decisions made on political grounds.85 The underlying problem is that cost-benefit 
analysis requires a certain amount of discretion and judgment. If elected officials 
seek to advance the interest of the majority rather than the general public, and can 
control the bureaucracy, then giving it discretion does not solve the problem of 
tyranny of the majority. 
 
4. Summary 
 
 Concerns about majority exploitation of the minority are really concerns 
that people with weak preferences about an issue determine policy that harms 
people with strong preferences about that issue. Under majority rule with one-
person-one-vote, people with strong preferences will prevail if they happen to 
form a majority, but if not, the policy outcome will reduce social welfare rather 
than increase it. If those people with strong interests systematically lose whenever 
a vote is held, outcomes will be deeply unfair and inequitable as well as 
inefficient. But even if they sometimes win and sometimes lose, social welfare 
will decline rather than increase over time. 
 
 As we have seen, institutional designers have developed numerous ways 
of solving this problem, including the use of supermajority rules, weighted voting, 
judicial enforcement of rights, and cost-benefit analysis. And, as we have seen, all 
of these approaches are deeply flawed. We now turn to a possible solution. 
82 Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No 
Number?, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 45 (1994); Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: From Dubious to 
Hopeless, 26 J. Econ. Persp. 43 (2012).  
83 This is also an objection to our proposal, which we discuss below. 
84 Adler & Posner, supra note. 
85 See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal 
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1489 (2002). 
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II. Quadratic Voting 
 
A. The Problem 
 
 Suppose that the legitimate purpose of government is to advance the 
public interest, and that advancing the public interest involves the welfarist goal 
of generating gains for individuals. Suppose further that a public project can be 
legitimate even though it produces losers as well as winners (as it inevitably will) 
as long as the winners in aggregate gain a great deal and the losers in aggregate do 
not lose too much—or as long as gains and losses are fairly distributed so that 
over the long term everyone or nearly everyone gains on net. We don’t need to be 
specific about how gains and losses are aggregated, and can acknowledge that 
large gains to the very rich may not justify small losses to the very poor. 
 
 If the key difficulty with traditional voting rules is that they do not give 
influence to people in proportion to the intensity of their preferences, then the 
solution must address this problem in particular. Political scientists and 
economists have proposed an enormous variety of voting systems to do just that. 
The basic approach of these voting systems is to allow people to cast more votes 
when their preferences are intense. Few of these systems have been implemented. 
The problem is that they are too complex for people to understand, or too 
vulnerable to manipulation.86 
 
 It is useful to begin against the backdrop of the one institution that awards 
goods according to the intensity of preference: the market. In the market, people 
have different valuations for different goods; the market, when it works well, 
channels goods to those who value them the most. In effect, the people who care 
more about certain goods can express their interests in them to a greater extent 
than others, and thus exert a greater influence on the ultimate allocation of goods. 
86 The literature is complex; for a survey, see Mueller, supra note, at 147-181; Shepsle, supra note. 
See William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. Fin. 8 
(1961); Edward H. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, 11 Pub. Choice 17 (1971); 
Theodore Groves, Incentives in Teams, 41 Econometrica 617 (1973) (the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 
mechanism, which is too complex and vulnerable to collusion, and so has not been used despite its 
canonical status). For a recent contribution, see Rafael Hortala-Vallve, Qualitative Voting, 24 J. 
Theoretical Pol. 526 (2011). For criticisms of the canonical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, 
see Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, The Lovely but Lonley Vickrey Auction, in 
Combinatorial Auctions 17-40 (Peter Cramton et. al. eds., 2006); Michael H. Rothkopf, Thirteen 
Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical, 55 Operations Research 191 
(2007) (showing manipulability).  
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They do so, of course, by paying more money for those goods than other people 
do. The price system forces people to make tradeoffs—to sacrifice the power to 
make purchases in the future in return for the power to make purchases today—
and in this way enables people to sincerely reveal the strength of their preferences 
in ownership of various goods, and obtain those goods that they value the most. 
This is the famous logic of the “invisible hand” that ensures markets provide 
efficient allocations, often called the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare 
Economics. 
 
 The market fails to provide public goods for familiar reasons—those who 
pay for goods cannot prevent others from free riding.87 That is why a political 
system with voting rules is necessary. But the analogy from the market suggests 
that we could protect the interests of the minority by allowing people to buy 
votes, or otherwise pay money to influence the allocation of public goods. 
 
 Suppose, for example, that the government implements a vote-buying 
system where people pay $1 to the government for one vote on a project like the 
construction of a park, and people can buy and cast as many votes as they want. 
The government builds the park if people buy more votes for the park than against 
it. And if vote-buying seems improper, consider that it already takes place in 
corporations, where investors can increase their influence over corporations by 
buying shares and the votes that come with them (and even votes without shares, 
subject to some minimal corporate-law constraints).88 It might seem that one can 
generalize: if some people pay money to the government in return for greater 
influence on political outcomes, and money helps fund those outcomes for the 
benefit of others, then the people who pay the most should have the greatest 
influence on outcomes. 
 
 There are two problems with this scheme. The first is that it gives the 
wealthy excessive influence over political outcomes. The rich can buy more votes 
than the poor, and even if they end up paying more for public projects, there is no 
guarantee that those projects will advance the public good. The second problem—
and our focus—is that the proposal does not in fact give voters or vote-buyers the 
right incentives to cast their votes for projects that advance the public good. 
 
 To see why, consider a simple setup where the goal of the government is 
to maximize the well-being of the public, as measured by people’s willingness to 
pay for public projects. A project should be approved, for example, if its backers 
87 Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Rev. Econ. Stat. 387 (1954). 
88 Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden 
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 811 (2006). 
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would be willing to pay in aggregate $100 for its implementation while its 
opponents would be willing to pay only $90 to block it. To evaluate projects, the 
government must elicit people’s willingness-to-pay, which is generally private 
information. (It is not always entirely private information; when governments 
perform cost-benefit analysis, they estimate willingness-to-pay based on observed 
market behavior. But cost-benefit analysis has well-known limitations and there is 
almost always some component of private information.89) People have strong 
incentives to exaggerate their willingness-to-pay. A person willing to pay $10 for 
a project might as well say that she would be willing to pay $20 or $100. Thus, 
the government cannot elicit preferences simply by asking people what they are. 
 
 What about the vote-buying scheme? Now people must pay money, and 
the requirement that they pay might put limits on their ability to exercise 
influence over outcomes that is disproportionate to their interest in those 
outcomes. One might think that a person who values a project like a park at $10 
would offer $10 to the government in return for 10 one-dollar votes, and a person 
who opposes the park might pay, say, $9 to block it. The government could 
aggregate the payments (which could be put into its budget) and approve the 
project if people buy more votes in favor of it than against it. 
 
 But people would not act this way. Most people would probably pay 
nothing for (or against) the park and instead free ride. A person would reason that 
if she buys some votes, they will not affect the outcome, especially if there are 
thousands of voters, while the votes cost her something. And if she reasons farther 
along the chain of outcomes, she might realize that others will think like her, in 
which case maybe no one on her side will vote, in which case she would waste 
money by voting. To be sure, she might realize that, based on this reasoning, no 
one on the other side will vote either, in which case her votes might make a 
difference. But it is quite unlikely that the small probability of affecting outcomes, 
even given the behavior of others, will give her the right incentives to buy votes. 
 
 An example will illustrate the argument. Consider two members of a large 
population, Pro and Con. Pro expects to gain $1000 if the government implements 
a project, while Con expects to lose $50 from the project. Each person can buy 
votes at $1 each. To determine how many votes to buy, Pro must first estimate the 
probability that she will be the pivotal voter, and thus will affect the outcome. She 
should not spend money on votes unless she can affect the outcome; otherwise, 
she loses without gaining anything in return. Suppose Pro estimates that for every 
vote she buys, she can increase the likelihood of approval of the project by one 
89 See supra. 
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percent—at least, for a range of votes. Thus, each vote has an expected benefit of 
$10. Pro will buy a lot of votes—stopping only when an additional vote increases 
the probability of winning by less than one percent, which would happen if and 
when Pro owns a large enough fraction of votes than the additional expected 
impact of another vote declines to a low level. 
 
 Con, by contrast, will likely buy no votes. If he, like Pro, expects that each 
additional vote will have a one percent impact, then the expected gain from a vote 
is 50 cents, while the cost is $1. Yet the government wants to know Con’s 
preference. If there is only one Pro, but more than 20 Cons, the Cons in aggregate 
would be willing to pay more than Pro does. But because the Cons pay nothing, 
the government approves a project that reduces group welfare. In fact, game 
theoretical analysis under a variety of assumptions has shown that this simple 
voting scheme leads to the dictatorship of the single individual with the most 
intense preference, as illustrated in this example.90 
 
 Thus the vote-buying scheme we have described will not work. It does not 
force people to sincerely reveal their preferences, and so it will produce outcomes 
that do not advance social welfare. It addresses and overcomes the major problem 
of majority rule—that it does not enable people to exert influence in proportion to 
the intensity of their preferences—but only at the cost of replacing it with an even 
worse system, dictatorship: while it allows Pro, in a minority of one, to prevail 
over the many Cons when Pro’s preferences are sufficiently intense, it does so 
even when the Cons should prevail because of their large numbers, and in other 
examples it would not help the minority at all. Yet the hypothetical vote-buying 
scheme also makes clear why conventional voting is problematic as well. 
Conventional voting provides no method for people to reveal the strength of their 
interests. One casts a single vote and can do no more. 
 
B. Quadratic Voting 
 
 Recently, one of us proposed a variant of vote-buying that solves the 
problems we have been discussing.91 Under Quadratic Voting (QV), everyone 
may buy as many votes as she wants, and pays for each vote, but the price she 
pays is the square of the number of votes that she casts. One vote costs $1, 2 votes 
cost $4, and so on. A project is approved if the votes in favor exceed the votes 
against. The money that is collected is returned to all voters on a pro rata basis. 
90 Eddie Dekel et al., Vote Buying: General Elections, 116 J. Pol. Econ. 351 (2008); Eddie Dekel 
et. al., Vote Buying: Legislatures and Lobbying, 4 Q. J. Pol. Sci. 103 (2009); Alessandra Casella 
et al., Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes, 120 J. Pol. Econ. 593 (2012).  
91 Weyl, supra note.  
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 Suppose, for example, that the government announces a proposal to build 
a park in the center of town. Every member of the town is given the right to vote 
for or against the proposal. People who live in the center of town strongly favor 
the park. Some of them spend $100 for 10 votes; others $81 for 9 votes or $121 
for 11 votes, or even more. People who live farther from the center are less 
enthusiastic about the use of tax dollars for a park that they will rarely be able to 
visit. Some of them favor the park but only slightly; they buy 1 vote for $1 or 2 
votes for $4. Others do not buy any votes at all, or spend a few dollars to oppose 
the park. And then there are some people who strongly object to this use of 
taxpayer dollars. They spend $100 for 10 votes against the park, or $144 for 12 
votes, and so on. The government counts up the votes: if the proposal receives a 
majority of votes, it is approved. The money that is collected is then distributed 
back to people pro rata. For example, if 1000 people live in town, and $10,000 is 
collected, then everyone receives $10 back. This means that people who spend 
(say) $9 for 3 votes (for or against) will end up netting $1. Thus, people who 
oppose or support the park only slightly are fully compensated even if they lose. 
People who spend more money are partially compensated. 
 
 To understand why the voter should pay the square of the number of votes 
she paid rather than some other amount (such as the cube or some other power), 
consider Table 1, below, which shows the cost of voting under QV, and includes 
the marginal cost—the additional amount that a voter must pay to cast an 
additional vote.92 
 
Table 1: Total and Marginal Cost of Voting Under QV 
Votes Total Cost Marginal Cost 
1 1 1 
2 4 3 
3 9 5 
4 16 7 
5 25 9 
6 36 11 
7 49 13 
8 64 15 
16 256 31 
32 1024 63 
92 The marginal cost is the cost of casting n votes minus the cost of casting n-1 votes. For example, 
the marginal cost of casting the fifth vote is the cost of casting 5 votes (25) minus the cost of 
casting 4 votes (16), which equals 9. 
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As can be easily seen, the marginal cost of casting a vote is always (within $1)93 
proportionate to the number of votes cast. It costs twice as much at the margin to 
cast 4 votes than to cast 2 votes ($7 rather than $3); twice as much to cast 8 votes 
than to cast 4 votes ($15 rather than $7); twice as much to cast 16 votes than to 
cast 8 votes ($31 rather than $15); and so on. 
 
 Rational agents maximize their utility by setting marginal cost equal to 
marginal benefit. This means that if John values being able to incrementally move 
the outcome in his favor twice as much as Sue values being able to incrementally 
move the outcome in her favor, John will pay twice as much at the margin as Sue 
does. For example, John buys 16 votes while Sue buys 8 votes. The exact number 
of votes that John and Sue buy depends on their estimates of how likely they will 
be pivotal voters, as explained below, so if John buys 16 votes for $256 (162), this 
does not mean that he values the project at $256. But it does mean that he values 
the project twice as much as Sue, who buys 8 votes. The government can thus 
determine which group of people—supporters or opponents—is willing to pay 
more in aggregate for the project even though it does not know how much any 
individual (or the group) values the project. Crucially, QV gives weigh both to 
numerosity and the intensity of interests. A large group of people with weak 
preferences might outvote a very small group of people with intense preferences, 
but not a somewhat larger group of people with intense preferences. 
 
QV works best with a large number of voters: the more voters there are, 
the more accurately the system works. QV’s efficiency relies on all voters 
perceiving the chance of their changing the outcome with an additional vote as the 
same. When the number of voters is large, such a perception is (approximately) 
accurate. If it is small, it is less so. With a small population, it becomes possible 
for people to have different perceptions about the likelihood that an additional 
vote will change the outcome (that is, the likelihood that there would otherwise be 
a tie, in which case an additional vote is pivotal). For example, in a small group 
that consists of a number of moderate voters on one side of an issue, and an 
extreme voter on the other side, the extreme voter will believe that a tie is less 
likely than the moderate voters will believe. The moderate voters assume that all 
voters are (on average) moderate and so discount the possibility that anyone is 
extreme, while the extreme voter knows that this is not the case because she 
93 An artifact of the numerical example, not a feature of the model. The voter gains the marginal 
benefit from casting a vote times the number of votes cast (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝑣𝑣), and pays the square of the 
number of votes cast (𝑣𝑣2). Setting marginal benefit equal to marginal cost, 𝑣𝑣∗ = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀/2. 
Accordingly, the number of votes that a voter casts will be proportionate to her marginal benefit. 
The result is driven by the fact that the derivative of a quadratic equation is linear. 
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knows that she is an outlier. If the extreme voter cares more about the issue than 
the moderate voters in aggregate, she will buy fewer votes relative to her utility 
than is socially desirable and QV will suffer the same bias towards the majority 
that other democratic procedures entail, though in a less severe form. If the 
situation were reversed and the extreme voter cared less than the three others in 
total, a reversed failure could occur. The three voters are overconfident and expect 
to win easily, but the extremist knows that, because of her strong preferences and 
thus her willingness to buy many votes, a tie is more likely than it appears. In this 
case, QV could lead to dictatorship in the same manner as standard vote buying. 
Despite this, simulation evidence indicates that QV almost always outperforms 
majority rule.94 
 
However, as the size of the group increases, the probability of either of 
these problems arising becomes small because no individual is capable of having 
much influence on the chance of a tie. In a large enough group, everyone has the 
proper incentive to buy votes in a way that reflects her honest appraisal of her 
likelihood of being pivotal. QV is not perfectly efficient, only approximately so, 
with the approximation growing more precise as the population grows larger,95 
and as the variance of the preferences of the members of the population declines. 
Both of these properties closely resemble those of a well-functioning market in a 
market economy: If markets are not thick enough, then large sellers or buyers may 
have market power that prevents perfect competition. Simulations indicate that 
groups of a few dozen will almost always produce efficient results.96 
 
 QV addresses the problem of varying intensities of preferences by giving 
those with stronger preferences a means of influencing the outcome in proportion 
to the strength of their preferences. They may still lose to the majority, but they 
will not lose to a majority with weak preferences (unless the majority is extremely 
large). Majorities will prevail over minorities—as they should—when the 
intensities of everyone’s preferences are similar. But when minorities are 
sufficiently intense, or relatively large and intense, they can protect their interests 
from majority domination. Indeed, QV ensures optimal outcomes (with high 
probability if there are many voters) if the goal is to maximize the well-being of 
the group. Thus, it is superior to majority and supermajority rule or any other 
voting rule, which cannot, except extremely crudely, protect people with strong 
preferences. QV is also superior to cost-benefit analysis because cost-benefit 
94 Steven P. Lalley and E. Glen Weyl, “Quadratic Voting,” in progress; contact Glen Weyl at 
weyl@uchicago.edu for a draft. 
95 At a rate of 1/√𝑛𝑛 or 1/𝑛𝑛, depending on the distribution of values where n is the population. See 
Weyl, supra note. 
96 See Lalley and Weyl, supra. 
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analysis cannot incorporate private information about the intensity of non-market 
preferences. 
 
 Figure 1 illustrates how QV works. The three straight lines illustrate the 
expected benefits that three different people obtain from a project. The lines slope 
upwards because the probability of prevailing increases with the number of votes 
one casts. In the example, person 1 obtains a marginal benefit of 1/2 from 
prevailing; person 2 obtains a marginal benefit of 1; and person 3 obtains a 
marginal benefit of 6/5. The curved line shows the quadratic cost of voting—the 
square of the number of votes cast. Inspection shows that each person buys a 
number of votes in proportion to the expected marginal benefit—person 2 buys 
twice as many votes as person 1, and person 3 buys 6/5 as many votes as person 
2. Indeed, as noted before, they buy a number of votes equal to half of their 
marginal benefit. Thus, the government can, by totaling up the votes and 
awarding the decision to the majority, perfectly reflect the aggregation of their 
preferences. 
 
Figure 1: Relative Voting Power Under QV 
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 A further point is that because of the redistribution, the voters who lose 
will be at least partly compensated. Recall that under QV, the money that is paid 
in is returned to members of the group on a pro rata basis. This means that 
members of an outvoted minority will receive some money back. Those with 
relatively weak preferences—who therefore did not buy many votes—are likely to 
be fully compensated, while those with stronger preferences will be only partly 
compensated. While it might be better if they were fully compensated, full 
compensation (which would guarantee Pareto outcomes) is not practical. 
Moreover, partial compensation is superior to no compensation, which is the 
outcome under majority rule, and to excessive compensation, which is the 
outcome when a large minority can block desirable projects under supermajority 
rule, and so can demand a large transfer in return for its consent. 
 
 We can illustrate with an example. Imagine a group of 30 people, divided 
into three groups of ten people with identical preferences.97 Anne (whose 
preferences are identical to those of everyone in the first group) obtains 1600 
from a project; Bruce loses 800; and Carla loses 400. Under majority rule, Bruce 
and Carla would outvote Anne even though Anne’s gain is greater than their 
combined losses. Under QV, Anne buys 8 votes in favor while Bruce buys 4 votes 
against and Carla buys 2 votes against—in all cases, because under QV a voter 
buys a number of votes equal to half her expected marginal benefit, which in this 
example is assumed to reflect everyone’s estimate that there is a 1/100 chance of 
being the pivotal voter. Table 2 shows that under QV Anne would pay enough to 
outvote Bruce and Carla 8 to 6. The penultimate column shows how the 
redistribution works, and the last column shows each person’s net payoff. 
 
Table 2: An Example  
Voter Benefit Marginal Benefit Votes Cost Share Net 
Anne (10) 1600 16 8 Pro $64 $28 $1600-64+28=$1564 
Bruce (10) -800 -8 4 Con $16 $28 -$800-16+28= -$788 
Carla (10) -400 -4 2 Con $4 $28 -$400-4+28= -$376 
QV   8 – 6: Pro   $400 
Majority Rule   2 – 1: Con   -$400 
 
Observe that QV produces the optimal outcome because Anne (and her 9 
doppelgangers) values the project more than Bruce and Carla (and their 
doppelgangers) disvalue it. Under majority rule, by contrast, the project is 
defeated. QV generates a surplus of $400 over majority rule. The sharing rule 
97 We assume 10 of each time because, as noted supra, QV works better with a large number of 
people than with a few. But in our discussion of the example, we focus on the three different 
representative agents. 
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reduces the variance of the outcome, though not by very much in this particular 
example. 
 
C. A Real-World Example: Proposition 8 
 
Let’s now consider a real example. Proposition 8 was the California ballot 
initiative that banned gay marriage in 2008. Proposition 8 became law because it 
received majority approval, 52 percent to 48 percent of those voting.98 
Proposition 8 almost surely burdened a minority—specifically, gays and lesbians 
who might want to marry—more than it benefited the majority, who may have 
seen moral or religious positions vindicated but were not otherwise directly 
affected by whether same-sex marriages existed or not. 
 
 We can illustrate the argument with some back-of-the-envelope 
calculations.99 Gay, lesbian, and transgender (LGBT) voters constituted about 
four percent of California’s population in 2010, while same-sex couples 
constituted about 0.7 percent of households. We assume that the average same-
sex couple would pay $100,000 for the right to marry, based on the fact that the 
average marriage ceremony costs $25,000 and LGBT couples are on average 
wealthier than heterosexual couples; and that single LGBT voters would pay 
$20,000 for the option to marry a same-sex person. This implies aggregate 
willingness to pay by LGBT voters to defeat Proposition 8 was $57 billion.100 If 
all LGBT voters voted against Proposition 8, then among heterosexuals, the vote 
was 52 percent to 44 percent, implying a margin of 3,040,000 heterosexual 
supporters of Proposition 8. Assuming supporters and opponents have similar 
preference intensities, the residual supporters would have to have been willing to 
pay $18,750 each, assuming non-LGBT opponents were willing to pay the same 
amount, in order for Proposition 8 to have been welfare-maximizing. This seems 
most unlikely. In California, the median household income was $61,021 in 
2008.101 It is hard to believe that people who are deeply opposed to same-sex 
marriage would pay almost a third of their income to block it. Thus, Proposition 8 
seems like a clear example of tyranny of the majority—where a majority with 
weak preferences prevails over a minority with strong preferences. 
 
98 See Tamara Audi, Justin Scheck & Christopher Lawton, Votes for Prop 8, Wall St. J. (Nov. 5, 
2008), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122586056759900673. 
99 Taken from Lalley and Weyl, supra note. 
100 38,000,000 * 0.007 * 100,000 + 38,000,000 * 0.04 * 20,000. 
101 See U.S. Census Bureau, Median Household Income for States: 2007 and 2008 American 
Community Surveys (Sept., 2009), available at https://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/acsbr08-
2.pdf. 
36 
 
                                                 
 If we assume more realistically that the marginal 8 percent of supporters 
would have been willing to pay on average $400 to ban same-sex marriage, while 
the (approximately) 4 percent of opponents would have been willing to pay on 
average $20,000, then the opponents would outvote the supporters under QV. 
Suppose, for example, that everyone thought the probability of affecting the 
outcome by buying a vote is one tenth of one percent. Then the supporters would 
buy 0.2 votes for 40 cents and the opponents would buy 10 votes for $100. The 
opponents would outvote the supporters even though there were only half as many 
opponents. 
 
 One might object that people’s willingness to pay is beside the point; 
either there is a right to same-sex marriage or there isn’t. Moreover, QV would 
not have blocked Proposition 8 if the gay and lesbian population were sufficiently 
small or supporters’ preferences were sufficiently strong. This might seem unjust 
and wrong. 
 
 But this objection puts the cart before the horse. Rights will be recognized 
only if there is sufficient political or institutional support for them. Gays and 
lesbians do better in a QV system than in a majority or supermajority rule system 
because the intensity of their preferences regarding matters close to their everyday 
lives will exceed the intensity of the moral or ideological preferences of the 
average voter, and QV, unlike the other systems, allows preference intensity to 
affect political outcomes. Judicial enforcement of rights will protect gays and 
lesbians only if judges are persuaded to do so—and that will happen only if 
judges with the right ideological preferences are in office. In practice, judges do 
not protect all minorities (there is no way to do that) or even the minorities who 
most need protecting. They protect minorities who participated in the majority 
coalition that appointed the judges a generation or so earlier. So in some eras, 
judges appointed by Democratic presidents protect African-Americans, poor 
people, and other constituents of the Democratic Party—while in other eras, 
judges appointed by Republican presidents protect creditors, property-owners, 
gun owners, and other constituents of the Republican Party. If QV had been in 
place in 2008, Proposition 8 likely would never have passed, and so supporters of 
same-sex marriage would not have had to wait until 2013 for the courts to rule it 
unconstitutional.102 Indeed, if QV had been in place earlier, then a ballot 
proposition legalizing same-sex marriage probably would have been passed 
before 2008. 
 
102 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (holding that petitioners lacked standing). 
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 QV protects minorities by giving people with intense interests that are 
disregarded by the majority a chance to affect political outcomes, but it does not 
fully displace judicial review. Someone must enforce the rules of the game, and 
courts play that function in our society. QV would have been useless against Jim 
Crow because blacks in the south were disenfranchised: being disenfranchised 
under QV is no better than being disenfranchised under a traditional voting 
system, though as we discuss below QV does dramatically reduce or eliminate the 
incentive for such disenfranchisement. Moreover, various theories of judicial 
review—for example, that it is necessary to protect fundamental values—may be 
unaffected by our argument. But judicial review would become significantly less 
important if a system of QV is in place. 
 
D. Would the Rich Exert Too Much Influence under QV? 
 
 QV offers more influence to those with greater financial resources than 
they could obtain under simply majority rule. The rich are willing to pay more for 
any given non-financial good than are the poor because money is worth less to 
them. One might thus worry that a society governed by QV would be inequitable. 
In this section, we show that from the standpoint of equity, QV is likely to be 
superior to one-person-one-vote majority rule. 
 
1. Pure Transfers 
 
 One possible concern is that rich people will buy votes to support 
monetary transfers from poor to rich. This will not happen, however. While the 
rich are willing to pay more to obtain non-financial goods than are the poor, they 
are not willing to pay more to obtain money. Consider a scheme that took a dollar 
from every individual in the bottom 50% of the income distribution and gave $50 
to every individual in the top 1%. A member of the top 1% would not pay more 
than $49 to enact such a proposal, which would give them 7 votes each. Such a 
proposal could be defeated by the bottom 50%, each buying 0.5 of a vote, which 
would only cost him or her a quarter each. Robbing the poor to pay the rich never 
prevails under QV. 
 
 QV blocks purely redistributive projects because it permits only efficient 
projects and redistributive projects are not efficient because they do not generate 
wealth. Indeed, as we will see, QV permits redistributive projects only to the 
extent that people care about distribution. Because wealthier people do care about 
the poor103 (although maybe not enough), under QV they will support some 
103 Charlotte Cavaille & Kris-Stella Trump, Support for the Welfare State Over Time: The Two 
Dimensions of Redistributive Preferences, (2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
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redistribution to the poor, just as they do under majority rule. By contrast, because 
the poor do not—in their own minds or anyone else’s—benefit by giving their 
money to the rich, QV would not result in redistribution to the rich. 
 
2. Redistribution as Social Insurance 
 
 We can make this argument more rigorous by considering some theories 
about why redistribution exists in the first place. One influential economic view 
of the purpose of redistribution (or progressive taxation), first put forward by 
Vickrey,104 is that taxation is a form of social insurance. Taxes and transfers blunt 
risks that are outside of any individual’s control, thus providing her with valued 
insurance against bad events like sickness and job loss. The problem, however, is 
that taxes and transfers also blunt incentives to work and improve oneself. Thus, 
the optimal tax-and-transfer system balances these two factors—redistributing 
enough to protect people from the risk of income loss while not so much as to 
excessively blunt incentives to be productive. 
 
One complication is that when people vote for tax-and-transfer schemes, 
they already know something about themselves—including, at least roughly, the 
risk that they may lose their jobs and benefit from social insurance. To understand 
this problem, we can consider three extreme cases. In the first, suppose people 
know nothing about themselves: they choose whether to support a social 
insurance scheme behind the veil of ignorance, before anyone makes any 
investments to improve their human capital or knows whether they will be lucky 
or unlucky in the lottery of life. In such a case, everyone would support the 
optimal, behind-the-veil-of-ignorance tax policy that maximizes utilitarian 
welfare. The reason is that a social insurance scheme is a public good—one that 
in this context gives everyone an insurance policy for which she would be willing 
to pay. This problem was studied by Mirrlees105 and while debate rages about 
parameters that determine the optimal tax policy, most economists believe it 
involves high and progressive taxes.106 QV would produce this outcome simply 
because it always chooses the welfare-maximizing result. 
 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2110010. This may be driven by altruism or 
fear that the poor will cause trouble unless they are paid off. 
104 See William Vickrey, Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk, 13 Econometrica 319 
(1945).  
105 J. A. Mirrlees, “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 Rev. Econ. 
Stud. 175 (1971).  
106 Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to 
Policy Recommendations, 25 J. Econ. Persp. 165 (2011).  
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 In a second case, suppose that individuals are highly uncertain about their 
earnings but all investments that determine these earnings have already been 
made. In this case, there would be an extremely strong temptation to impose 
100% taxation, even though, having known this beforehand, no one would have 
made any investment. This is a well-known time-consistency problem that can 
easily lead to excessive taxation of accumulated capital and most countries avoid 
the temptation for such taxes because they know that it will deter future 
investment. Democracies develop institutions like courts to reduce the risk of 
time-inconsistent policies; leaders also seem to understand that if they violate past 
commitments, they will not be trusted in the future. Thus, countries usually pay 
off sovereign debt so that they can borrow again. QV does not directly block 
time-inconsistent policies, but neither does majority or supermajority rule. But 
QV, unlike those other rules, does block time-inconsistent policies that are purely 
redistributive to the majority (or supermajority). 
 
 In a third case, opposite to the second, one can imagine the case where no 
investments have yet been made but everyone knows exactly the realization of the 
factors outside of their control that determine their destiny. In this case, insurance 
has no value to any individual and even though some individuals will favor higher 
taxes for redistribution, such taxes have no efficiency benefits. In this case, QV 
will favor eliminating redistributive taxation entirely.  
 
 However, this case is just as unrealistic as the second one. In reality, some 
investments are sunk and some uncertainty realized, but likely about roughly 
equal amounts of each, at least when averaged over the population. In this setting, 
QV would produce the optimal social insurance plan covering the residual level of 
uncertainty. Given the balance, it is likely the optimum would resemble that in the 
first case, where agents choose the social insurance system behind the veil of 
ignorance. 
 
By contrast, equilibrium in such a model under one-person-one-vote 
majority-rule voting is indeterminate, or at least no one has ever been able to 
derive a determinate outcome. The problem is that any coalition of 51% of the 
population has an incentive to choose policies that are highly disadvantageous to 
the other 49% of the population. This coalition might be the bottom 51% of the 
distribution in terms of their current luck-accumulation and income, in which case 
democracy may be highly redistributive, expropriating the top 49% at the 
revenue-maximizing rate. This rate will not be confiscatory because beyond a 
point taxation is counterproductive because of reduced effort. But Saez shows that 
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this revenue-maximizing rate is extremely high, upwards of 80%.107 On the other 
hand, if the coalition is the top 51% of the population, the incentive will be to 
maximize the revenue extracted from the bottom 49% and redistribute to the top 
51%. That is, the outcomes yielded by majority rule are hard to predict, as many 
coalitions are possible. This fact is borne out by historical experience of coalitions 
in democracies shifting from protecting the interests of elites to attempting to 
redistribute from these elites. 
 
 One way to generate a more definite prediction is to restrict the policies 
the government can implement. The most famous such analysis is due to Meltzer 
and Richard.108 They argue that a government choosing a proportional tax rate 
and rebating the proceeds evenly across the population will choose the tax to 
maximize the preferences of the individual with median income. This outcome 
may be more or less redistributive than the optimum that QV will implement. If 
the median income is quite high relative to the mean (if there is little inequality at 
the top end of the income distribution) but many individuals are in dire poverty, 
Meltzer and Richard predict that majority rule will lead to very little 
redistribution. However, QV would lead to strong redistribution because the risk 
of falling into extreme poverty would loom large enough in each individual’s 
utility calculus to blunt the opposition of the middle class to redistribution to the 
poor.. If there is little poverty but significant income inequality towards the top of 
the distribution, then Meltzer and Richard would predict more redistribution than 
QV. 
 
 But such a linear tax and transfer system is only one way to implement 
redistribution and many, if not most, democracies do not operate that way. For 
example, Holland argues that in most developing countries formal state transfers 
do not reach the poor and instead are targeted at the middle class that works in the 
formal sector.109 In such settings, democracy will experience swings (based on 
whether at a given time a majority is or is not covered by the formal system) 
between “cozy” middle class regimes that harm the poor and rich equally with 
high tax rates that sponsor generous pensions for the middle class, and “populist” 
governments that gut the state and are supported by the wealthy and the poor 
while being opposed by the middle class. This pattern fits the politics of many 
Latin American countries. QV, by contrast, will consistently yield a moderate 
107 Emmanuel Saez, Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates, 68 Rev. Econ. 
Studies 205 (2001).  
108 Allan H. Meltzer & Scott F. Richard, A Rational Theory of the Size of Government, 89 J. Pol. 
Econ. 914 (1981). 
109 Alisha C. Holland, Redistributive Politics in Truncated Welfare States (Harvard University 
Dep’t of Government Working Paper, 2013).  
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level of formal benefits that trades off providing insurance to the middle classes 
against the costs of inefficiency and undue burdens on the poor. 
 
 Thus, majority rule is not the ally of sensible, balanced, egalitarian 
policies it is often made out to be. Exactly what outcomes majority rule favors is 
extremely sensitive to the particular coalitions that are cobbled together to form a 
majority. Some of these coalitions will produce outcomes that are more 
redistributive than is optimal, others less. Nearly all political outcomes will be 
unfair and inefficient. This may explain why there is huge variation across 
democracies in the distribution of wealth. It is simply a mistake to assume that 
majority with one-person-one-vote must lead to an equitable distribution. QV, by 
contrast, consistently favors the optimum that balances the benefits of social 
insurance against the deadweight loss created by excessive taxation.110 
 
3. Altruism of the Rich 
 
 Redistribution of wealth may also be motivated by altruism by the wealthy 
or middle class, or by related concerns, for example, that inequality is a source of 
social instability. Under this assumption, a transfer of wealth is just a public 
good.111 Because QV generates efficient outcomes, it will produce such a public 
good, leading to some degree of redistribution to the poor. By contrast, one-
person-one-vote majority rule does not lead to efficient outcomes, as we have 
explained. A large minority that passionately seeks to use tax receipts to fund 
poor relief can easily be outvoted by a small majority that does not care about the 
poor or cares very little. Accordingly, along this dimension (and putting aside 
reasons why majority rule could lead to excessive redistribution discussed in the 
prior section), QV should lead to the more equitable outcome. 
 
4. Biased Projects and Laws 
 
 One might also worry that even if QV does not produce monetary transfers 
from poor to rich, it will generate projects that the rich favor and the poor 
disfavor. For example, one might imagine that a city that uses QV would fund 
yachting marinas and public art rather than parks, or pot hole repair on streets in 
rich neighborhoods and not streets in poor neighborhoods. The rich would pay 
110 Subject to the time-consistency and partial failure of the veil-of-ignorance problems, as 
discussed above. 
111 See, e.g., James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of 
Warm-Glow Giving 
100 Econ. J. 464 (1990) (modeling altruism as a warm-glow with implications for the supply of 
public goods). 
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more for votes than the poor, and this would cause a bias in favor of public 
projects that the rich prefer. 
 
 However, there are several reasons for doubting that the rich would have 
excessive power under QV. First, the rich as a group do not have influence if they 
are on both sides of an issue, as they often are. And quadratic pricing minimizes 
the impact of large wealth disparities because the cost of buying votes increases 
exponentially. A rich person who sought to outvote one thousand poor people 
would need to spend $1 million for 1000 votes if each poor person spent $1 for 
one vote. 
 
Second, while the rich exercise greater influence, they must pay for it—
just as they do in the private market—and the money will end up in the pockets of 
the non-rich. Indeed, the very poor, who are indifferent to many public projects 
and therefore often do not vote, will likely do better under QV than under the 
current system, because the rich and middle class must, in effect, pay the poor 
whenever they vote. Under the current system, a poor person can exercise 
theoretical influence over same-sex marriage by exercising the vote but is not 
likely to do so; under QV that person at least receives money in return for 
yielding influence to others, and she can use this money to buy food and clothes. 
By allowing the wealthy to obtain greater influence over public goods, about 
which they care more, by transferring to the poor greater influence over private 
goods (in the sense of giving them money through the QV process which they can 
use to buy goods and services they need), QV would likely improve distributive 
justice rather than reduce it. In effect, QV gives the poor a new asset (the power to 
influence the allocation of public goods) that they can sell to the rich in return for 
money that they need more than the influence. 
 
Many public projects—New York’s Central Park, Chicago’s Millennium 
Park—reflect the preferences of the wealthy who partly finance the projects in 
return for influence over them. Thus, Millennium Park contains sophisticated 
artwork to a far greater degree than an ordinary public park does. The poor benefit 
both from the public good and the fact that they don’t need to pay for as much of 
it out of their taxes. Thus, one must remember that even under the status quo, the 
rich exert greater influence over public projects by financing a disproportionate 
share of them—an arrangement that may not be optimal or ideal but seems to be 
mutually beneficial. A system of QV would institutionalize this process and make 
it more transparent and fair. 
 
 Indeed, it is far from obvious that QV would increase the influence of the 
wealthy compared to the status quo, where the wealthy already have a variety of 
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means to buy influence through lobbying, campaign spending, and similar 
activities.112 These pathways to influence would be greatly dampened by QV. The 
reason is that under the current system, people who want to exert influence target 
the swing voters—the people who don’t care and thus can be moved to change 
their vote on the basis of relatively small expenditures on advertising. Under QV, 
there is no reason to target the people in the middle because those people will not 
buy very many votes even if they are shifted over at the margin. Influencers 
would use their money to target more passionate people because those people 
spend a lot of money on their marginal vote. Their financial interest thus may 
make them more susceptible to reasoned argument. 
 
 Much of government policy already reflects the influence of wealth people 
because of the nature of cost-benefit analysis, which is routinely used by agencies. 
Cost-benefit analysis is based on the willingness-to-pay of affected people, which 
in turn is based on their market behavior. Thus, if rich people care more about 
clean air than poor people, and so are willing to pay more for it, then 
environmental regulations will cut pollution in a way that reflects rich people’s 
preferences more than poor people’s preferences.113 While some people believe 
that this is unfair, the general view is that preferences among rich and poor do not 
in practice vary enough to make a difference in government policy choices. If this 
is so, then quadratic voting would also not favor the rich over the poor. 
 
Third, the social consequences of walling off the public sphere from 
efficiency is often not to make the public sphere “fairer” but to shrink it. Cities 
where the wealthy cannot express their willingness to pay to keep streets clean 
and safe and to create public infrastructure because majority rule gives them no 
means of doing so are plagued by what John Kenneth Galbraith in The Affluent 
Society called “the social imbalance” where people emerge from Rolls Royces 
112 For evidence, see Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness (2005) (showing 
how government policy typically benefits the very well off). The problem has been exacerbated by 
Supreme Court decisions that have limited the power of the government to regulate campaign 
contributions and spending. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). But the original campaign finance regulations that were 
struck down had only ambiguous effect. The problem is that donations have become a means for 
people with intense preferences to affect political outcomes, but also give an advantage to the 
wealthy. Thus, restricting the use of wealth has ambiguous welfare consequences. An interesting 
proposal to require anonymity of donations would reduce the incidence of quid pro quos but 
would not address the larger problem. See Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars 
(2002). 
113 In principle, cost-benefit analysis values the lives of rich people more than the lives of poor 
people. W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. Econ. Literature 1912 
(1993). See Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 Duke L.J. 385 (2004), 
on poverty and mortality values. Note, however, that regulatory agencies use a uniform valuation.  
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and Trump Towers to walk along potholed streets.114 This social imbalance leads 
the rich to retreat to the suburbs and to surround themselves with those similar to 
themselves. The social imbalance similarly leads to inaction on the international 
stage on global issues, like climate change and genocide. Those, often on the left, 
who believe in an active public sphere should not seek to defend a false 
egalitarianism that impoverishes the public sphere. 
 
Finally, if one rejects all of these arguments, a version of QV can still 
offer significant gains even without deviating at all from egalitarian norms in 
elections. In a race with more than two candidates, or an election where more than 
a single issue is decided, individuals could be allocated an artificial currency that 
they could use to quadratically buy votes on individual issues. This would allow 
individuals to trade less influence on issues they care less about for greater 
influence on issues they care more about. By allowing people to express the 
intensity of their preferences, the process would help address many of the 
paradoxes and incoherencies of democracy that arise because standard voting 
systems do not allow people to express the intensity of their preferences.115 In 
fact, greater efficiency gains could be achieved if individuals were allowed to 
save these tokens across elections, devoting more to elections where they cared 
more. Another possibility would be to reduce the influence of the wealthy by 
making individuals pay a quadratic fraction of their gross adjusted federal income 
rather than a quadratic number of dollars for influence. While both of these 
systems would achieve smaller efficiency gains than would QV using money, 
they could still greatly improve on simple majority rule. 
 
 It is important, as always, to compare QV with the existing political 
system or realizable variations of it, not with an unattainable ideal. In existing 
polities, the wealthier have more influence than the less wealthy because they can 
make campaign donations, take advantage of contacts, and so on. Under QV, this 
advantage would be both reduced and channeled more productively. 
 
E. QV in Representative Democracy 
 
The system of QV we have discussed so far resembles a referendum. 
People vote directly for a proposal by buying votes using the quadratic price. But 
114 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (1st ed. 1958). 
115 See Nicolas de Condorcet Political Writings, (Steven Lukes & Nadia Urbinati eds., Cambridge 
University Press 2012); Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), Allan 
Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41 Econometrica 587 (1973); Mark 
Allen Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence 
Theorems for Voting Procedure and Social Welfare Functions, 10 J. Econ. Theory 187 (1975).  
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referenda are rare in large countries, which (if they are democratic) rely on 
representative institutions. This raises the question how QVB would work in a 
representative democracy. 
 
 Voting for representatives under a system of QV could take different 
forms. In the interest of the space, we sketch out a possible approach but leave the 
details for future research. Consider a system in which voters buy votes for 
candidates for office by paying a quadratic price, with the money returned to 
voters pro rata. The QV system would operate at the level of the office—at the 
district level, for representatives; at the state level, for senators; and at the national 
level, for the president. The theory behind QV applies to representatives in the 
same way that it applies to projects. Under the QV system, the representative will 
be chosen whose expected performance maximizes the aggregate well-being of 
voters. Knowing this, candidates will select positions that maximize the welfare 
of their constituents, just as they choose positions maximizing the preferences of 
the median voter under majority rule.116 
 
 Applying QV to voting in a representative body requires an additional 
step. It would make little sense for legislators to put their own money at stake 
when voting. Instead, legislators should commit their constituents’ money when 
they vote on bills. Suppose, for example, that a set amount of money collected 
through taxes is sent back to districts (and states) at the end of every year. The 
amount of money legislators have committed through QV during that year is 
subtracted from that payment. Legislators would reflect their constituents’ 
interests faithfully so that they are reelected; and the legislators’ own votes would 
be aggregated efficiently. 
 
 Consider, for example, a vote on whether the U.S. government should go 
to war with a foreign country. Legislators would vote by committing their 
constituents’ money. If the legislators are faithful agents, passionate backers and 
opponents of the war would end up paying more money than people who are 
indifferent or close to indifferent. The redistribution of the money would blunt the 
impact but there would still be monetary winners and losers. Anticipating these 
costs and benefits, voters would elect and sanction their representatives using 
money from their own pockets based on QV. 
 
 Representative institutions face the same problem of preference 
aggregation that exists in the referendum-style votes that we discussed in the last 
section. Each representative represents a different group of constituents who have 
116 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957); John O. Ledyard, The Pure 
Theory of Large Two-Candidate Elections, 44 Public Choice 7 (1984). 
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different interests. A particular bill will affect those groups in different ways—
some greatly, others hardly at all. This means that representatives who seek 
reelection will also vary in their interests in passage of the bill. A majority of 
representatives who weakly oppose a bill may thus be able to outvote a minority 
of representatives who strongly favor it—reflecting the distribution of interests in 
the broader population. Thus, there is a constant danger that one-person-one-vote 
majority rule in representative bodies will lead to socially bad outcomes. 
 
 Representatives avoid these outcomes by logrolling: legislators are given 
pet projects in their districts in return for their support for national legislation. 
While many observers criticize such practices as corrupt,117 it is important to 
remember that many landmark legislative achievements never could have been 
accomplished without logrolling; the recent film Lincoln provides the particularly 
poignant example of the Thirteenth Amendment, whose passage in Congress was 
secured through various patronage payoffs to elected officials.118 New Deal 
legislation and civil rights laws would not have been passed but for logrolling.119 
 
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which was needed to 
address the financial crisis, was initially blocked in the House, and was passed 
only after leaders arranged for a range of payoffs, including a reduction in the 
depreciation schedule for improvements to restaurant buildings, extension of tax 
credits for solar energy installations, and tax exemptions or subsidies for film and 
television producers, rum producers in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, racing 
track facilities, manufacturers of wool products, and manufacturers of toy wooden 
arrows.120 Of course, logrolling is not always, or even usually efficient, and is 
typically done, not through direct and therefore efficient exchanges of tax 
payments across districts, but rather by wasteful pet projects.121 QV would offer a 
more rational, efficient and fair means of allowing the incentive to “bring home 
the pork” to be weighed against national interests in an efficient manner. It would 
thus channel existing corrupt or at least unseemly, but necessary, wheel-greasing 
into socially efficient bargaining. 
 
117 See Nicholas R. Miller, Logrolling, Vote Trading, and the Paradox of Voting: A Game-
Theoretical Overview, 30 Public Choice 51 (1977). See also, Dana Milbank, Republican 
Lawmakers Blindsiding the Party’s Conservative Base, Wash. Post (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-republican-lawmakers-blindsiding-the-
partys-conservative-base/2014/01/29/cb9bd984-8930-11e3-916e-e01534b1e132_story.html. 
118 Lincoln (DreamWorks Pictures & Participant Media 2012). 
119 See Caro, supra note. 
120 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5201 (2008).  
121 See Mueller, supra note, at 104-20 (discussing literature on logrolling). 
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What about the risk that wealthy people will buy their way into elected 
office by purchasing votes for themselves? Just like today, rich people will have 
an advantage under QV. But while rich people under the current system can 
improve their electoral prospects by using personal funds to buy advertising, rich 
people under QV would use their funds to buy votes, with the money being 
redistributed to the non-rich, rather than being wasted on advertisements. 
Moreover, because of the square function, QV would not give even very rich 
people a serious advantage. An illustrative example is Silvio Berlusconi. Under 
QV he could, with 2.5 billion euros (roughly half of his net worth), buy 50,000 
votes in a single election. That would only constitute 0.2% of the vote in the last 
Italian general election. On the other hand, at present Berlusconi has managed to 
win half a dozen elections in Italy, overwhelmingly because of the influence of 
his wealth. Thus, a very wealthy person, especially one very wealthy person able 
to dominate the media, can have far more influence through advertising than he or 
she could ever have through QV. 
 
 QV is a more natural fit for referenda than for representative institutions in 
the sense that it would require fewer far-reaching changes to how political 
institutions work. Thus, we make this proposal fully aware that it may seem too 
radical ever to be put in place and many details clearly need to be worked out. At 
the U.S. national level, it would require constitutional amendment; however, at 
local levels, experimentation is possible. Moreover, there are numerous second-
best type issues that we have not addressed. The role of the presidential veto in 
such a system is obscure; it is probably unnecessary. QV in representative 
assemblies would probably make more sense in a parliamentary system than in a 
presidential system. 
 
F. QV, the Franchise and Constitutional Stability 
 
One of the major advantages of QV is that it should lead to greater 
constitutional stability than exists under one-person-one-vote majority rule. The 
latter system is famously vulnerable to constitutional manipulation. Under a 
majority-rule system, the majority can simply pass a law that disenfranchises the 
minority. Whatever majority forms initially would be tempted to do this. 
Democracies have developed numerous elaborate mechanisms to prevent 
majorities from entrenching their power. For example, judges strike down laws 
that disenfranchise minorities, and amendment of the Constitution typically 
requires a supermajority. But if the Constitution is too hard to change, then large 
groups of people may seek change through extra-constitutional means, and to 
experiment with non-democratic forms of government like dictatorship. 
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By contrast, under QV only laws that are efficiency-maximizing can pass. 
This rules out any revision that replaces QV with a less efficient form of 
governance. It would rule out, for example, returning from QV to majority rule, or 
replacing QV with an oligarchy or dictatorship. While the majority or other group 
might favor such a move, those opposed would oppose more strongly and those in 
favor more weakly, precisely by the basic efficiency logic of QV. Additionally, 
recall that QV is only approximately (with high probability) efficient and that the 
approximation is more accurate the less that any individual with outlier 
preferences opposes the efficient proposals brought forward relative to the status 
quo. As a result, among all efficiency-enhancing measures, QV tends to favor 
those that create the fewest and the least extreme losers relative to the status quo, 
as the only thing that can defeat an efficient law under QV is the strong 
opposition of an extreme opponent. Thus, QV will not replace itself with a less 
efficient alternative and, if it replaces itself with a (as yet undiscovered) more 
efficient alternative, will do so in the way that minimizes the redistribution across 
individuals that occurs through the transition. Because no other practical and 
efficient alternative to QV exists,122 it seems highly unlikely such an efficient 
alternative would arise. QV is thus the maximally constitutionally stable form of 
governance. 
 
One form of constitutional change, for example, to which QV is resilient is 
the disenfranchisement of some subset of citizens. Even more strongly, QV 
actually favors the enfranchisement of individuals currently outside of the polity, 
so long as revenues are not shared with them. The reason is that individuals 
included in the system will exert influence on the decision only if they are willing 
to make transfers to the rest of the polity that compensate the polity for the 
externalities created by the newly-enfranchised individual. A good analogy is 
again the market economy: every country benefits by opening to free trade 
because of the possibilities it offers to benefit from the products of other 
countries. Because QV, like free trade but unlike standard voting systems, is a 
positive rather than zero sum game, QV will encourage broadening the sphere of 
political inclusion rather than shrinking it. 
 
QV is also likely to be much more resilient to extra-system revolutionary 
upheavals than majority rule is. Such upheavals are highly inefficient and thus 
any system that maximizes aggregate utility is likely to go to large lengths to 
avoid them. Democracies, also, go to lengths to avoid them. However, it can 
easily be in the interest of a narrow majority to risk such an upheaval in order to 
have a shot at expropriating the other 49% of the population. This has been the 
122 See Weyl, supra note.  
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source of many violent regime changes: Pinochet overthrew Allende for trying to 
use democracy to achieve radical redistribution;123 many of Hitler’s supporters 
voted for the Nazis because they feared the redistributive threat posed by a 
growing Communist party.124 This is clearly inefficient as it converts the 
redistribution that democracy creates into an aggregate loss of efficiency. The 
prospect of such an upheaval, on the other hand, will further reinforce the 
tendency of QV to select, among all efficient social decisions, the one that 
minimizes the maximum loss any individual receives relative to the status quo. 
QV thus seems more likely to be stable against violent overthrow than is majority 
rule. 
 
G. Other Objections to QV and Responses 
 
The taboo against vote-buying. Vote-buying is illegal in democratic 
countries. Indeed, there is a taboo against it. As we are painfully aware, any 
suggestion that vote-buying should be legalized will be met with incredulity. 
However, it is important to understand the source of the taboo, and to see why it 
does not apply to QV. 
 
As we explained in Part I, in a system of one-person-one-vote majority 
rule, such as ours, vote-buying would not improve outcomes. Instead, it would 
give excessive influence to people with the strongest preferences, and favor the 
rich. Thus, there is good reason to outlaw vote-buying in a regular system of 
majority rule. By contrast, the type of vote-buying that takes place in QV does 
produce optimal social outcomes, taking into account variations in the intensity of 
preferences as well as the number of people who hold particular preferences, and 
it does not favor the rich relative to the status quo system. In fact, under QV it 
would still be necessary to outlaw extra-system vote buying that could be used to 
undermine the quadratic nature of costs by allowing one individual to buy votes 
as a proxy for another. 
 
It is useful to draw analogies to other settings in which markets are not 
allowed to develop. For example, there is a taboo against the sale of human 
organs to people who need transplants. Instead, a complicated system based on 
need is used.125 But these taboos must be evaluated on their own merits. Debra 
Satz, for example, opposes markets in human organs because she believes that 
123 Pamela Constable & Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet (1993). 
124 See Harris, supra note. 
125 Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. Health Pol. 
Pol’y & L. 57 (1989) 
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those markets harm the poor.126 But QV should help the poor relative to the 
current voting system. Others believe that certain norms against buying and 
selling shouldn’t be disturbed because they reflect important human values. But 
vote-buying is permitted in the corporate setting,127 which suggests that the 
prohibition on vote-buying does not reflect some intrinsic moral constraint but 
instead advances specific institutional values that vary by context. This is, in fact, 
straightforward. Voting is just a procedure that takes place in a larger institutional 
context that enables a group to make collectively beneficial decisions. If vote-
buying advances the well-being of the group, then it should be permissible. 
 
Voting and irrationality. Many have argued that because individuals have 
such a tiny chance of being pivotal in elections it is irrational for individuals to 
vote.128 The argument we provided for the optimality of QV depends on voter 
rationality. One might therefore wonder whether majority rule might not be better 
than QV in dealing with such irrationality. 
 
In fact, voter irrationality is not a problem for QV as long as the 
irrationality is approximately uniform across individuals—more specifically, is 
not correlated with the utility that they gain from different laws or projects. 
Suppose, for example, that people generally overestimate the probability of being 
pivotal, or vote for reasons unrelated to the specific gains from an election such as 
a sense of civic duty. These factors will raise the number of votes bought by most 
individuals, but maintain the proportionality between vote bought and utility so 
long as they operate in a reasonable manner that is uncorrelated with utility. 
Irrationality would produce problems for QV only if (for example) people who 
gain more from a political outcome systematically overestimate (or 
underestimate) their probability of being pivotal while people who gain less from 
the political outcome do the opposite. As far as we know, there is no evidence for 
such patterns. 
 
 In fact, under almost all of the standard models political scientists use to 
explain voter turnout, QV actually performs better when voters are not perfectly 
rational than when they are. The approximate efficiency of QV becomes even 
more accurate as more voters participate. Recall that the only way QV can lead to 
an inefficient outcome is that a very extreme individual decides to “buy the whole 
126 Debra Satz, Why Some Things Should not be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets (2010). 
See also Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (2012); 
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (1983). 
127 See Black & Hu, supra. 
128 See, e.g., André Blais, To Vote or Not to Vote? The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice 
Theory (2000). 
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election.” This is only possible because other individuals, confident in the victory 
of the socially optimal outcome, do not buy many votes. However if individuals 
irrationally buy a large number of votes, the threat of such an extreme spoiler 
vanishes, as it becomes too expensive for her to attempt to steal the election. 
 
 Meanwhile, while irrationality may explain why people vote as often as 
they do under a system of majority rule, it cannot justify majority rule relative to 
QV. Voter irrationality will increase the amount of voting but not stop majorities 
from expropriating from minorities. 
 
 Credit constraints. We have argued above that the willingness of the rich 
to pay for a dollar is not greater than the willingness of the poor to pay for a dollar 
and thus redistribution from the poor to the rich would not be a plausible outcome 
under QV. But, one might argue, the rich are more able to afford to pay for votes 
in the short term. Even if the willingness of the poor to pay is the same or greater, 
they might be unable to get access to the cash in the short-run. 
 
 The logic of the square function, however, not only makes this false, but 
actually reverses the logic. Suppose that there is an issue up for a vote favored by 
one person and opposed by 99 that would bring a benefit to the one person of $99 
million and a harm to the 99 people of $1 million each. Suppose further that, 
without the bill passing, the lifetime income of the beneficiary is $100 million 
dollars and the lifetime income of those harmed is $1 million each. Thus one 
might think that the “poor” would have a hard time raising the cash: they are 
being asked to decide on a project that could deprive them of their lifetime 
wealth! 
 
 However, it is easy to see things are quite the reverse. In this case the 
chance that a marginal vote is pivotal will be roughly 4 thousandths of a 
percent.129 This leads the beneficiary to want to buy about 2200 votes in favor and 
the opponents to want to buy 22 votes against each. This would cost the 
proponent about $5 million and the opponents $500 each. $5 million is 5% of the 
lifetime income of the proponent while $500 is 5 one-hundredths of a percent of 
the lifetime income of each of the opponents. It seems wildly implausible that it 
would be harder for each of these individuals to come up with $500 than it would 
be for the proponent to come up with $5 million. If, because individuals were 
irrational, they perceived a greater chance of their being pivotal, the calculation 
would be even more lopsided. 
 
129 See Weyl, supra note, for calculations. 
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 Frivolous voting. One might be concerned that the redistribution under 
QV could give people an incentive to propose frivolous projects in order to force 
votes and benefit from the redistribution. Suppose, for example, that a person 
proposes that Illinois be sold to China. If the proposer does not vote, while others 
vote (presumably) against the proposal, the proposer will collect a share of the 
money spent for the votes. This would be possible in principle if anyone were 
allowed to put anything on the ballot. But that would not be a sensible way to set 
an agenda for QV votes. The system we instead propose is one where items are 
not placed up for votes unless they have sufficient support, the same way a 
referendum does not go forward onto a ballot unless it has collected sufficient 
signatures. Support under QV, however, would be judged not by the number of 
signatures but by the total willingness-to-pay to see the initiative on the ballot, as 
gauged by a QV initiative process. 
 
 In particular, individuals could cast as many votes as they want in support 
of the petition, paying the square of the number of votes they cast. The funds thus 
given would be transferred on to votes for the initiative if it made it onto the 
ballot. The item would be put up for a vote only if some support threshold were 
reached, say, 1% of the population in votes. This would ensure that no one could 
benefit by forcing others to vote on an issue; they could only get an item on the 
ballot by committing funds, which they would then be forced to pay. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Constitutional designers have struggled, with only limited success, to 
create political institutions that advance the common good. Authoritarian and 
oligarchic systems give a dictator or ruling class the responsibility of acting for 
the benefit of all, but fail to advance the public good because the individual or 
elite has no incentives—other than the fear of revolution—to do so. Democracy 
provides a method for the majority to influence outcomes directly, but it has never 
solved the problem of how to account for the varying intensity of preferences. 
Because majorities—both entrenched and temporary—can outvote minorities 
with intense preferences, democratic outcomes can cause more harm than good, 
and can lead to conflict and political disruption. 
 
 Various efforts to respond to this problem by using different voting rules 
or subjecting majority voting to constraints create additional problems. 
Supermajority rules, including bicameralism, cause gridlock, which harms 
everyone. Judicial enforcement of rights can block good outcomes as well as bad 
outcomes. The most successful countries have worked around institutional 
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limitations, using logrolling and campaign finance, for example, but these 
workarounds are themselves costly, imperfect, and controversial. 
 
 We have argued that QV provides a third way. It allows political 
institutions to aggregate preferences both across number of people and intensity 
of preferences. It thus should lead to better outcomes and less conflict. We doubt 
that wholesale replacement of political institutions with QV will occur anytime 
soon, but do believe that QV has enough promise that policymakers should 
consider experimenting with it in carefully controlled settings, as we have begun 
to do for smaller-scale group decisions. 
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